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AUDITOR COMMON LAW LIABILITY IN THE STATE COURTS:
A RECENT (1980-94) OUTCOME RESTATEMENT AND
PERSPECTIVES OF THE ACCOUNTING AND LEGAL
PROFESSIONS
Dr. Joyce Holley*
Dannye Holley*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a trend toward increased legal liability of
certified public accountants, particularly in the audit role.1 This recent
development in auditor liability law is significant to both lawyers and
accountants. 2 The premise of this article is the evaluation of a series of
important court decisions from the perspectives of the accounting and legal
professions, and an attempt to forge shared views of the reasons for and

*

Associate Professor of Accounting, Texas Southern University.

Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University.
The "Big Six" accounting firms reported to the Securities and Exchange Commissions that their
collective total costs for legal judgments, settlements, and costs were $367 million, $487 million, and $783
million for 1990, 1991, and 1992 respectively. SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 1993, at 41. The nation's
seventh largest accounting firm went bankrupt at the end of the 1980's due to malpractice judgments,
settlements, and costs. Id. at 42. But see Kimberly Reeves, Accountants Callfor Tort Reform to Limit
Damages and Liability,HOUSTON Bus. J. 52 (1993) (stating that almost ninety percent of the total costs
were from settled cases).
Claims against small firms during the 1980's and into the 1990's are different. Most of the smaller firms
are insured under the AICPA's malpractice insurance plan. During the years from 1982 to 1992, the number
of claims ranged between five and seven percent of the total number of policies covered by the plan. The
total number of policies fluctuated much more significantly from a starting figure in 1982 of 10,865, to a
high of 15,553 in 1985, to a low of 9,441 in 1990, and ended in 1992 with 10,352. Furthermore,
approximately 24.2% of the total number of claims arose from audit engagements which accounted for 32%
of the claim dollars paid. Hence, audits ran a close second to tax engagements (25.6%) and ahead of review
engagements (19.6%) as a potential source of malpractice claims, Here'sHow FloridaStacks Up, FLORIDA
CPA TODAY, Nov. 1993, at 10. See infra note 14 [discussing comparative (by firm size) increases in
malpractice insurance costs over the same period-.
See Emily Couric, The Tangled Web, 79 A.B.A.J. 65 (1993) (noting that all of the largest malpractice
claims against attorneys have occurred in the last seven years, including fourteen settlements of $20 million
or more). But see David M. Trubek, et. al., The Costs ofency of litigation must use as a baseline, the
number of opportunitiesto use the courts). See also infra note 161.
**

2

MARC J. EPSTEIN & ALBERT D. SPALDING, THE AcCOuNTANT'S GUIDE TO LEGAL UAB1LYr

AND

ETIuCS (1993)(suggesting that recent increases in malpractice claims against accountants places the entire
profession at risk). See Couric, supra note I (discussing the increase in legal malpractice as following the
Wave of lawsuits against other professionals and finding a direct link between the increase in third party
lawsuits against accountants and the subsequent increase of such non-client lawsuits against lawyers).

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
significance of the outcome of these decisions. This article focuses on
common law auditor liability decisions of the state courts of last resort made
since 1980.'
The cases in this study were selected for many reasons. First, all
decisions involve lawsuits filed against auditors that reached at least one state
appellate court since 1980. These cases involve the common law legal
standard of auditor liability.' Second, this standard of liability is primarily
developed by the states' appellate courts, predominantly by the states'
"supreme" courts." Finally, this study focuses on state supreme courts'
decisions because of their importance as precedent.
Courts and
3
Gary Lawson and Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-PartyLiability of
Accountants andAttorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1309 (1991) (written by two
authors when one was an attorney and the other a Certified Public Accountant). This article does not cite
secondary sources written about auditor liability where the authors belong to only one profession, or those
in which one or more of the authors is both a lawyer and an accountant because it is very difficult for one
person to bring the perspectives and interests of each profession to the analysis of auditor liability. See
infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the need for cooperative efforts between accountants and
lawyers).
4
See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. The cases in this study were selected by use of
the WESTLAW legal data base. The WESTLAW system purports to identify all the reported decisions with
respect to a subject matter heading. The subject researched was "Accountants". The search performed was
a "Key Number Search". Key numbers are organized to focus on specific issues within a subject, and again
purport to identify all reported cases which contain a discussion of the specific sub-topic. In this study, the
Key Numbers studied under the heading "Accountants" were Keys 8-11. Specific sub-topics of these keys
include "duties and liabilities" (#8), "duties and liabilities to third persons" (#9), "Actions" (#10), and
"Damages" (#11). The final search of these key numbers for this study was completed at the end of
September 1994. Only those cases located under these key numbers which contained evidence that an audit
or its equivalent was the accounting engagement that became the basis of the plaintiff's claim were included
in the study.
5
The authors decided to exclude from this study all decisions made by the federal trial and appeal
courts because when these courts sit in diversity and decide important common law development issues,
they certify the question to the state supreme court. See Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.
1987).
6
A few states such as New York and Kentucky do not title their highest court as the "supreme
court," this article will use "Supreme Court(s)" to refer to all states highest court(s).
7
Lawrence Baum & Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines in the
Law of Torts, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 83 (M. Porter
& G. Tarr eds., 1982) (discussing an empirical study of state supreme courts that concluded that the
creation and greater authority given to intermediate state appellate courts freed the state supreme courts
to be more selective in the cases they hear, and hence play an even greater role in policymaking). See also,
Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,30 STANFORD L REv. 121, 142145 (1977); Note, CourtingReversal: The SupervisoryRole of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191
(1978); Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Taar, Introduction to STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
in the FEDERAL SYSTEM (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); and Robert F. Williams, State
ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L REV. 169, 207 (1983). See also, Security Pacific

AUDITOR COMMON LA W LIABILITY
commentators have acknowledged this superior precedential role of state
supreme courts' decisions.' However, some accounting and legal literature
has treated all court decisions as being fungible.'
A total of thirty-three state supreme court decisions, made by twenty-two
state supreme courts, will be evaluated with respect to accounting and legal
professions' perspectives."0 In addition, a total of sixteen state intermediate
appellate opinions, representing five new states, and client plaintiff cases from
Florida will be analyzed." This article evaluates and identifies those
jurisdictions which decided at least a majority of their decisions in favor of
auditors, and those which decided at least a majority of their decisions in favor
of plaintiffs. 2
The accounting and legal professions examine these cases from different
perspectives. Auditors look to the significance and difficulty of the work
performed by the accountants.1 3 A second key accounting perspective is that

Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (N.Y., 1992), a case in this
study, for a state supreme court's view of the relative insignificance of lower federal court opinions as
precedent with respect to a state substantive law doctrine crafted by a state supreme court.
a
lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Neb. 1984). See Courting
Reversal, supra note 7 at 1191 (ns. 1 and 2 and authority cited therein), and at 1202 (suggesting that at least
as measured by likelihood of reversal by the state's highest court, the precedent value of intermediate
appellate and trial court decisions were fungible).
9
Joey D. Duke, Accountant'sLiability to Third Partiesfor Negligent Misrepresentation:Should
There Be a Uniform Standard, 14 AM. J. TRIAL. ADvOC. 133 (1990) (giving equal status to a California
intermediate decision in establishing the standard of care that audit firms owe third parties as the decisions
of the New York Court of Appeals); Mark H. Fik, Third-Party Liability of PublicAccountants, 71 MICH.
BUS. J. 1286, 1287 (1992). See also Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant to Third Parties, 46
A.L.R.3d 979, 1005 (1972)and Annotation, Accountant's MalpracticeLiability to Clients,92 A.L.R.3d
396 (1979). (Both providing an example that legal precedent is fungible at all levels).
See KENT E. ST. PIERRE, AuDrrOR RISK AND LEGAL IABILrY, 25-27 (1982)(providing an example of an
accounting publication, that treats precedent as being fungible).
10
See infra notes 21, and 35-37 and accompanying text. It was not always clear in evaluating cases
for inclusion in this study, even when the appellate court asserted that an audit was involved in the lawsuit,
that an audit engagement was material to the asserted claim, see, e.g., Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563, 563-64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). These somewhat doubtful cases were nevertheless
included in the study. See also discussion infra note 129.
1
See infra note 38.
12
See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
13
In a recent survey, most of the 2000 responding accounting firms identified keeping up with
regulations and standards as their greatest current professional challenge, Standards Overload#1 Problem,
16 PuBuc AccouNTING REPORT 21, l(Nov. 1992). HBJ Miller "GAAP Guide or 1993 identifies several
levels of self-regulation sources that a competent auditor must know and apply: Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards ["GAAS"-; Statements on Auditing Standard; Audit Interpretations (A.I.) of "GAAS";
Statements on Quality Control Standards (SQCS); Industry Audit Guides; Statements of Positions of The
Auditing Standards Division (clarifying Industry Audit Guides); the Code of Professional Responsibility;
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most auditors are keenly aware that the cost of their malpractice insurance has
significantly increased since 1980, which is primarily attributable to the
increased possibility that a lawsuit could be filed against them for alleged
failure to properly perform an audit engagement. 4
The legal community, on the other hand, views case law from a different
perspective. Lawyers view complex issues such as the proper auditor liability
standard as one of interest identification, evaluation, and accommodation. 5
They are interested in the legal standards 'that treat similar interests in the
same manner, especially when the interests being compared include those of
members of the legal profession. 6 One of the concerns with auditor liability

and Notices to Practitioners. The Guide indicates that with the exception of the Notice to Practitioners,
these other self-regulation sources are "authoritative" as they have been approved by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).
In addition, an audit engagement requires that the audit fim keep abreast of and apply Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to the financial activity of the client for the period in question,
and report on whether the client's actions are in conformity with GAAP. A GAAS standard (SAS 52), for
example, makes direct reference to GAAP, and identifies for auditors and directs them to follow a hierarchy
of GAAP standards. See also Epstein and Spaulding, supra note 2, at 125 (identifying the complexity and
resulting difficulty for auditors with respect to this intricate self-regulation scheme).
The depth of auditor self-regulation standards is in sharp contrast to the scant self-regulation standards
for the legal profession with respect to providing authoritative guidance on the quality of lawyering. But
see discussion infra note 69.
14
Since the mid 1980's liability insurance costs for the "Big Six" accounting firms have increased
tenfold. For other large firms of fifty or more CPAs, costs have increased threefold, and for smaller firms,
they have doubled. Robert Mednick, Liability CrisisUpdate, 8 NEw ACCOUNTANT, Nov./Dec. 1992, at
30. See also CPA Insurance Soarsas Claims Take-Off, v.16 #15, Aug. 1992, at 2-3 and Forthe Record:
"Big Six Respond to the Liability Crisis,6 ACCOUNTING TODAY, Sept. 1992, at 3.
With respect to the parallel escalation in lawyer malpractice insurance costs during the 1980's, see
Couric, supra note 1 (asserting without reference to sources that legal malpractice premiums increased at
an annual rate of one hundred to three hundred percent during the mid-1980's).
Is
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,545 (1948), Justice Douglas quoted (from In re Tache, 37 S.E.C.
629, 671 (1957) that "...few areas of the law are in black or white. The grays are dominant and even among
them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is one of making accommodations
between conflicting interests." One of the decisions studied herein evaluated the role of the auditor as an
"arbiter, interpreter, and umpire among all of the varied interests" who use the audit firms' work product.
H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 150 (N.J. 1983).
16
"Formal Justice" requires equal application of principles and institutions to classes defined by
them. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 58 (1971). Section 299A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS provides that all professionals are required to adhere to the same general standard: to perform
professional services with the same training, knowledge, and skill as that possessed by members of that
profession in good standing. Constance F. Fain, 5 ProfessionalLiability, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS,
DEFENSES, DAMAGES, at 48 (1991). But see supra note 13 (providing a reason why the auditor's burden
under this general standard may be significantly more onerous.
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decisions is whether malpractice standards for auditors are the same as
malpractice standards for lawyers and other professionals. t7
Part one of this study restates how auditors fared in the state supreme
courts and selected state intermediate courts from 1980-1994, and then
explores reasons for these outcomes suggested by the accounting and legal
literature." In Part two, there is a return to the key accounting and legal
professions' perspectives discussed in the proceeding paragraphs.' 9 This part
identifies lessons that the accounting and legal communities may draw from
these decisions. The article concludes by identifying future research questions
concerning auditor common law liability, including those questions most
likely to be of continuing significance to accountants and lawyers in the
twenty-first century. 20
Part One - Auditor Liability: Restating And Explaining The
Outcomes of State Supreme Courts And Selected Intermediate State
Court Decisions 1980-1994
A. Outcome Restatement
Twenty-two state supreme courts made thirty-three auditor common law
liability decisions during the period 1980-94.2" There have been more state
17

is
19
20
21

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
Colonial Bank

139-40 and accompanying text.
21-110 and accompanying text.
111-140 and accompanying text.
141-161 and accompanying text.
of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989) (audit firm wins

against third party plaintiff); Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987) (client wins
against audit firm); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (audit firm wins against third
party); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990) (third party plaintiff wins against
auditor); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff);
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989) (auditor wins against third
party plaintiff); Eldrd v. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991) (audit firm wins
against third party); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988) (auditor wins against third
party plaintiff); Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff);
Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (auditor wins against third
party plaintiff); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990) (third party wins against audit firm); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 452 N.W.2d 746 (Neb. 1990) (third party wins against audit
firm); Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300 (Neb. 1984) (client wins against
auditor); Demetracopoulos v. Wilson, 640 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1994) (audit firm wins against third party);
Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984) (client wins against auditor); H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler,
461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983) (third party plaintiff wins against auditor); Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
supreme court decisions with respect to auditor liability in this period than
during the first eighty years of the twentieth century.22 State supreme courts

Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992) (audit firm wins against third party); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 484 N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y. 1985) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff); Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Arto., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff); European
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y., 1985)(separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance, decided same day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation,
but with a different result - third party plaintiff wins against auditor); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367
S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988) (third party plaintiff wins against auditor); Grant Thorton v. Windsor House, Inc.,
566 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1991) (audit firm wins against third party, but this time third party was the entity
audited. Client was state government agency, paying for audits to scrutinize entity compliance with government payment regulations); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1989) (client wins on two
causes of action, but auditor wins on other cause of action); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982) (third party plaintiff wins against auditor); United States Nat'l Bank of Or.
v. Fought, 630 P.2d 337 (Or. 1981) (third party plaintiff wins against auditor); First Nat'l Bank of
Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1986) (auditor wins against third party plaintiff);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991) (third party wins against audit
firm); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993) (third party plaintiff wins against audit firm);
Seaward Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283 (Va. 1990) (audit firm wins against client); First
Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v.Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989) (third party plaintiff wins against
auditor); Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 436 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989) (third party plaintiff wins
against auditor); Citizens State Bank v. Timm., Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983) (third party
plaintiff wins against auditor).
2
The bases for selecting these pre-1980 audit liability cases is explained, supra note 4. Flagg v.
Seng, 60 P.2d 1004 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (audit firm wins against client); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce,
214 So. 2d 505 (3d DCA 1968) (audit firm wins against third party); Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v.
Columbia Casualty Co., 156 So. 116 (Fla. 1934); Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 132 N.E.2d 27 (111.App.
Ct. 1956) (client wins against audit firm); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (third party
plaintiff wins against audit firm); Board of County Comm'r of Allen County v. Baker, 102 P.2d 1006 (Kan.
1940) (client wins against audit firm); Ronaldson v. Moss Watkins Inc., 127 So. 467 (La. App. 1930)
(client wins against audit firm); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1954) (client wins
against audit firm); City of East Grand Folks v. Steele; 141 NW 181 (Minn. 1913) (client wins against audit
firm); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Atherton, 144 P.2d 157 (N. M. 1943) (audit firm wins against
client); 1136 Tenants Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 36 A. D. 2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007, affd. 281
N.E.2d 846 (App. Div. 1971) (client wins against audit firm); Duro Sportswear Inc. v Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d
20, 132 N.Y.S.2d 51, affd. 285 A. D. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1954) (audit firm wins against client);
National Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 A. D. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1939) (client wins against audit
firm); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 16 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1938) (audit firm wins against third party);
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (audit firm wins against third party); Craig v.
Anyon, 212 A. D. 55, 208 N.Y.S.2d 259, aff'd. 152 N.E. 431 (A. D. 1925) (client wins against audit firm);
Beardsley v. Ernst, 191 N.E. 808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (audit firm wins against third party); Landell v.
Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919) (audit firm wins against third party); Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486
S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (audit firm wins against client); Shatterproof Glass Cov. App. 1971)
(third party plaintiff wins against audit firm); American Indem. Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (audit firm wins against third party).
See also Kagan, et. al. State Supreme Courts, supra note 7, at 142, documenting the one hundred year
trend of common law tort doctrine cases becoming in ever increasing percentage of the decisions of state
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rendered only one favorable decision to an audit firm during the period from
1980 through 1994, where the firm was being sued by its own client.23
However, such courts rendered favorable decisions to the auditors' clients in
four decisions during this same period.2
State supreme courts rendered decisions, during the period 1980-94,
favorable to auditors in fifteen decisions when a third party was the plaintiff.25
State supreme courts rendered decisions favorable to third party plaintiffs in
thirteen decisions during this period.' Overall state supreme courts rendered
decisions between 1980-94 favorable to auditors in sixteen decisions, and
favorable to plaintiffs in seventeen decisions.
The state supreme courts of Alabama27, Iowa", Nebraska2 9 , New Jersey30 ,
New York, Ohio3 2, Virginia33 , and Wisconsin3 4 have made multiple

supreme courts; and Id. at 145, specifically noting that despite their prominence, a combination of products
liability and all forms of malpractice cases had increased from only .5 to 1.6 percent of all state supreme
court decisions when 1920-50 decisions were compared to 1955-70 decisions.
3
Seaward Int'l, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 283.
24
Blumberg, 514 So. 2d 922; Lincoln Grain, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 300; Levine, 478 A.2d 397;
Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d 206 (decision favorable to plaintiffs on two causes of action, while
favorable to defendant auditor on only one cause of action).
2
Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 390; Bily, 834 P.2d 745; Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at
198; Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 772 P.2d 720; Eldred, 468 N.W.2d 218; Pahre,422 N.W.2d 178; Brueck,
638 P.2d 904; Jenson, 335 N.W.2d 720; Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 315; Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d
279; Security Pac.Bus. Credit, Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1080; Westpac Banking Corp, 484 N.E.2d 1351; Credit
Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d 110; GrantThorton, 566 N.E.2d 1220; FirstNat'l Bank of Minneapolis., 394
N.W.2d 709.
2
FirstFla. Bank, 558 So. 2d 9; Thayer, 793 P.2d 784; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 452
N.W.2d 746; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d 138; EuropeanAmerican Bank & Trust Co., v. Strauhs & Kaye,
Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y., 1985)(separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance, decided same
day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation, but with a different result - third party plaintiff wins
against auditor); RaritanRiver Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d 609; Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d 212; United
States Nat'l Bank of Or., 630 P.2d 337; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d 592; Ward, 435 S.E.2d 628;
FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefield, 386 S.E.2d 310; Imark lndus., Inc., 436 N.W.2d 311; Citizens State Bank,
335 N.W.2d 361.
2
Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d 390; and Blumberg, 514 So. 2d 922.
29
Eldred,468 N.W.2d 218; Pahre,422 N.W.2d 178.
29
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d 746; Lincoln Grain, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 300.
30
Levine, 478 A.2d 397; and H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d 138.
31
Security Pac.Bus. Credit, Inc., 59 7 N.E.2d 1080; Westpac Banking Corp., 484 N.E.2d 1351;
Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d 110; EuropeanAmerican Bank & Trust Co., v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc.,
483 N.E.2d 110 (separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance, decided same day with Credit
Alliance, hence with same citation, but with a different result - third party plaintiff wins against auditor)
32
Grant Thorton, 566 N.E.2d 1220; Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d 206; and Haddon View Inv.
Co., 436 N.E.2d 212.
33
Ward, 435 S.E.2d 628; SeawardInt'l, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 283.
U
Imark Indus., Inc., 436 N.W.2d 311; and Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d 361
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decisions. Ten state supreme courts rendered favorable decisions to the
defendant auditor in their decisions between 1980-94, or at least in a majority
of their auditor liability decisions of this recent period.35 Ten state supreme
courts rendered a decision favorable to the plaintiff in their only decision
between 1980-94 or at least in a majority of their auditor liability decisions of
this period. 36 The remaining two state supreme courts each made two
decisions: one favorable to the auditor, and the other favorable to the
37
plaintiff.
Five additional states, whose state supreme courts made no auditor
liability decisions during the period 1980-94, and Florida, whose state
supreme court made no client/plaintiff decisions during this period, had state
intermediate appellate court(s) make a total of sixteen such decisions.38
35
Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.
1987); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Eldred v.
McGladrey, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Brueck
v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); Demetracopoulos v.
Wilson, 640 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1994); Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597
N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992)(audit firm wins against third party); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 484
N.E.2d 1351, (N.Y. 1985)(audit firm wins against third party); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson,
483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985)(audit firm wins against third party); European American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110 (separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance,
decided same day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation, but with a different result - third party
plaintiff wins against auditor); First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D.
1986).
36
First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Mayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784
(Mont. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 452 N.W.2d 746 (Neb. 1990);
Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300 (Neb. 1984); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d
397 (N.J. 1984); H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry,
367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Grant Thorton v. Windsor House, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1991)(audit
firm wins against third party); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1989)(client wins
against audit firm); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982)(third party
wins against audit firm); United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Fought, 630 P.2d 337 (Or. 1981); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford,
386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989); Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 436 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989);
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
37
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989) (auditor wins against
third party plaintiff); Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987) (client wins against
firm); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993) (third party plaintiff wins against firm); Seaward
Int'l Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283 (Va. 1990) (audit firm wins against client).
38
Hydroculture Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 848 P. 2d 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Devco Premium
Fin. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Holland v. Arthur Anderson, 571
N.E.2d 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), (formerly 127 1MI.
App.3d 854, (IlI. App. Ct. l9bbs, 539 N.E.2d 877 (I1l.
App. Ct. 1989); Huls v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Brumley v. Touche
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Decisions favorable to auditors were made in ten of these intermediate
opinions, while six decisions were favorable to plaintiffs.39 Categorizing the
outcomes of the intermediate appellate decisions by jurisdiction, results in
three jurisdictions rendering a majority of their decisions favorable to the
auditors, one jurisdiction where the decisions were favorable to the plaintiffs,
while the Illinois and Texas intermediate appellate courts each made four
decisions - two favorable decisions to auditors and two favorable to
plaintiffs.'
Clients as plaintiffs did not fare as well in the intermediate appellate
courts as they did in the state supreme courts. In nine of the cases, from five
jurisdictions, clients were the plaintiffs." t Five of the client-as-plaintiff
decisions, from four jurisdictions, were favorable to the auditors.42 In the
other four decisions, from four jurisdictions, the decisions were favorable to

Ross & Co., 487 N.E.2d 641 (11. App. Ct. 1985); Local 1064 v. Ernst & Young, 516 N.W.2d 492 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994); Harper v. lnkster Pub. Schs., 404 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Jaffe v. Harris, 338
N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993); Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Brown v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 856 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d
707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mrktg. Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
39
Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278 (auditor wins against a client's surrogate - trustee in
bankruptcy); Devco Premium Fin. Co., 456 So. 2d at 1216 (auditor wins against client); Holland, 571
N.E.2d at 777 (audit firm wins second appeal because of the inability of client's successor in interests, the
trustee in bankruptcy, to prove that the damage to the client was caused by the wrongdoing of the auditors).
Huls, 535 N.E.2d at 72 (auditor wins against third party plaintiff); Harper,404 N.W.2d at 776 (auditor
wins against third party plaintiff); Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228 (auditors win against client partnership); MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563 (audit firm wins against third party plaintiff); Lindner
Fund,770 S.W.2d at 437 (auditors win against third party plaintiff); Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 742 (audit firm
wins against third party plaintiff); University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707 (auditor wins against client).
The six decisions favorable to plaintiffs were: HydrocultureInc., 848 P.2d at 856 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(client wins against audit firm); FirstNat'l Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877 (client wins against auditor); Brumley,
487 N.E.2d at 641 (third party plaintiff wins against auditor); Local 1064, 516 N.W.2d at 492 (client wins
against audit firm); Greenstein,Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 170 (client wins against auditor); Blue Bell
Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 408 (third party plaintiff wins against auditor).
40
Florida, Michigan, and Missouri were the three jurisdictions which rendered at least a majority
of their intermediate appellate decisions in favor of auditors, while Arizona rendered a decision favorable
to plaintiffs. The cases are identified by outcome supra, note 39.
41
Hydroculture Inc., 848 P.2d at 856; Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278; Devco Premium
FinanceCo., 450 So. 2d at 216; Holland,571 N.E.2d at 777; First Nat'l. Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877; Local
1064, 516 N.W.2d at 492; Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707;
Greenstein, Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 170.
42
Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278; Devco Premium Finance Co., 456 So. 2d at 1216;
Holland,571 N.E.2d at 777; Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707.
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the clients.43 When the client as plaintiff state supreme court and intermediate
state appellate court cases are combined, court holdings were favorable to
auditors in six decisions, whereas appellate courts holdings were favorable to
clients in eight decisions."
Similar to client plaintiffs, third party plaintiffs fared worse in state
intermediate appellate courts than they did in state supreme courts. In seven
of the cases, involving four jurisdictions, third parties were the plaintiffs.4"
The holdings in five cases, from four jurisdictions, were favorable to auditors,
whereas there were two decisions from two jurisdictions favorable to the third
party plaintiffs.46 When the third party as plaintiff state supreme court and
intermediate appellate court cases are combined, court holdings were
favorable to auditors in twenty decisions and favorable to third party plaintiffs
in fifteen decisions.4 7
43
Hydroculture Inc., 848 P.2d at 856; First Nat'l Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877; Local 1064, 516
N.W.2d at 492; Greenstein,Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 170.
Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278; Devco Premium Finance Co., 456 So. 2d at 1216;
Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 777; Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707; and
Seaward Int'l Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283 (Va. 1990). Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514
So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987); Hydroculture Inc., 848 P.2d at 856; FirstNat'l Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877; Local
1064,516 N.W.2d at 492; Lincoln Grain Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300 (Neb. 1984); Levine
v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1989)
(auditor prevails in one cause of action out of three); Greenstein,Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 170 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987).
45
Huls v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72 (ll. App. Ct. 1989); Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at
641; Harperv.InksterPub. Schs., 404 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Mid-American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989); Brown v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
4
Huls, 535 N.E.2d at 72; Harper,404 N.W.2d at 776; Mid-American Bank & Trust Co., 851
S.W.2d at 563; LindnerFund, 770 S.W.2d at 437, Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 742. Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at
641; and Blue Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 408.
47
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989); Bily v. Arthur
Young, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Idaho Bank &
Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Huls , 535 N.E.2d at 72; Eldred v.
McGladrey, 468 N.W.2d 218 (Iowa 1991); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Brueck
v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982); Harper,404 N.W.2d at 776; Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335
N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss.
1987); Mid-American Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563; Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 437;
Demetracopoulos v. Wilson, 640 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1994); Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick
Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992); Westpac BankingCorp. v. Deschamps, 484 N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y.
1985); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985); Grant Thorton v. Windsor
House, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1991); First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394
N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1986); and Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 742. The fifteen decisions favorable to third party
plaintiffs were: FirstFla. Bank v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at
641; Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co.,
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When the outcomes of all of the cases in this study are categorized,
twenty-six holdings are favorable to the defendant auditors and twenty-three
holdings are favorable to the plaintiffs.4" Twelve jurisdictions made a
majority of their decisions in favor of auditors; eleven states made a majority
of their decisions in favor of plaintiffs; and four states made an equal number
of decisions favorable to both auditors and plaintiffs.4 9

452 N.W.2d 746 (Neb. 1990); H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); EuropeanAmerican
Bank & Trust Co., v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y., 1985)(separate case consolidated for
appeal with Credit Alliance, decided same day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation, but with a
different result - third party plaintiff wins against auditor); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d
609 (N.C. 1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); United States
Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Fought, 630 P.2d 337 (Or. 1981); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822
S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986);
Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d
310 (W.Va. 1989); Imark Indus. Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 436 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1989); Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
ColonialBank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at; Bily, 834 P.2d at 745; Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d
at 278; Devco PremiumFinance Co., 456 So. 2d at 1216; Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga.
1987); Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 772 P.2d at 770; Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 777; Huls, 535 N.E.2d at 72;
Eldred, 468 N.W.2d at 218; Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 178; Brueck, 638 P.2d at 904; Harper,404 N.W.2d at
776; Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228; Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 720; Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 315; MidAmerican Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563; Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 437; Demetracopoulos,640
A.2d at 279; Security Pac.Bus. Credit,Inc., 597 N.E.2d at 1080; Westpac Banking Corp., 484 N.E.2d at
1351; CreditAlliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 110; Grant Thorton, 566 N.E.2d at 1220; FirstNat'l Bank of
Minneapolis, 394 N.W.2d at 709; Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 742; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707;
and Seaward Int'l, Inc., 391 S.E.2d at 283. The twenty-three decisions favorable to plaintiffs were:
Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 922; HydrocultureInc., 848 P.2d at 856; FirstFla. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 9; First
Nat'l Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877; Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 641; Local 1064,516 N.W.2d at 492; Thayer, 793
P.2d at 784; St. Paul Fire& Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 746; Lincoln Grain, Inc., 345 N.W.2d at 300;
Levine, 478 A.2d at 397; H.Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 138; EuropeanAmerican Bank & Trust Co., v.
Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d at 1 10(separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance,
decided same day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation, but with a different result - third party
plaintiff wins against auditor); RaritanRiver Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 609; Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d
at 206; Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 212; United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 630 P.2d at 337;
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 592; Greenstein,Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 170; Blue Bell Inc.,
715 S.W.2d at 408; Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 628; FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefield, 386 S.E.2d at 310; Imark
Indus. Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 311; Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 361.
49
The twelve jurisdictions making at least a majority of its 1980-94 appellate decisions in favor
of auditors were (unless specifically indicated decisions are those of the state supreme court): California,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan (intermediate appellate decisions), Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri (intermediate appellate opinions), New York, New Hampshire, and South Dakota. See supra
notes 35 and 40 and accompanying text for list of cases by jurisdictional outcome.
Florida intermediate appellate courts made two decisions in client/plaintiff cases, both in favor of the audit
firm. But because the Florida Supreme Court in a decision involving a third party made a decision
favorable to that plaintiff, it is misleading to count Florida twice, and on both side of this overall
jurisdiction/state count.
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B. The Outcomes: Perspectiveson "Favorable"and on the Case and
JurisdictionalAlignment
In deciding whether a decision was "favorable" to the auditor or the
plaintiff in this study, the analysis begar by focusing on the "appeal posture"
of the case. The concept of appeal posture used to guide the reported findings
included examining the decision of the state supreme court in light of whether
the auditor or plaintiff received a favorable trial decision, and how that trial
outcome was changed, if at all, by the intermediate state appellate court. 0
Appeal posture included the identification of the specific "grounds for error"
argued to the appellate court by one or both sides of these cases, and which
alleged errors were found to be error by the appeals court.5

The eleven jurisdictions making at least a majority of its 1980-94 appellate decisions in favor of
plaintiffs were: Arizona, Florida (state supreme court's only decision was in favor of third party plaintiff),
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, West Virginia,and Wisconsin.
See supra notes 36,40 and accompanying text for list of cases by jurisdictional outcome. The four states
with an equal number of decisions favoring audit firms and plaintiffs were: Alabama, Illinois (intermediate
appellate opinions), Texas (intermediate appellate opinions), and Virginia. See supra notes 33, 36 and
accompanying text for list of cases by jurisdictional outcome.
50
See Courting Reversal, supra note 7, at 1196-97 (identifying a set of variables by which to
measure success on appeal); See Stanton Wheeler, et. al., Do The Haves Come Out Ahead? Winning and
Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SOC. REV. 403, 406 (1987)(Empirical study
documenting and asserting the general tendency of state appeals courts to affirm lower courts. In the onehundred year period of the study, the sixteen state supreme courts studied affirmed in approximately sixty
percent (60%) of the cases they collectively reviewed). The controversial nature of auditor liability
standards and their application is demonstrated by the fact that in the thirty-three auditor malpractice
decisions by state supreme courts reviewed in this study, the twenty-two courts reversed in approximately
two-thirds of the cases.
See, e.g., Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d at 206 (providing an example of the difficulty of
characterizing a decision as favorable because two causes of action were decided in favor of the plaintiff
and one was decided favorably for the defendant).; See, e.g., Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 630 (providing another
example of the difficulty of characterization as the court ruled in favor of the audit firm concerning the
controversial third party duty issue, but reversed the lower court rejection of the possibility that this plaintiff
could recover on a third party beneficiary contract claim).
S
See Courting Reversal, supra note 7, at 1207-09 (evaluating with three gross variables
[constitutional, substantive, procedural issues- whether the nature of the issue on appeal affected the
overall results in the more than 5000 state supreme court decisions (1870-1970) evaluated in the study.
Finding that the mere presence of a constitutional issue did not significantly impact the probability that the
studied state supreme courts would reverse, but that there was more likelihood that these state supreme
courts would reverse a purely procedural issue rather than a substantive issue. In the forty-nine auditor
malpractice cases in this study, none of the appeals were based significantly on constitutional issues,
approximately fifteen percent of the appeals focused on application of the statute of limitations and other
procedural issues, and in the remaining cases the primary point of contention between the parties on appeal
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"Favorable" was also determined by evaluating the significant facts found
by appellate courts, and the influence these facts had on the court's decision. 2
"Favorable" was also defined by examining which legal doctrines each party
requested the court to accept.5 3 Moreover, "favorable" was defined by
examining which auditor or plaintiff interests were protected or subordinated
by the appellate court decisions.5 4
It is important to use such a multiple-factor evaluation in determining if
a decision is "favorable" to auditors or to plaintiffs. In assessing the impact
on interests, for example, only one of the state supreme court studied and only
one of the selected state court intermediate opinions included an affirmance
of a money award against a defendant auditor.5 ' Auditors who were involved
in cases that were eventually appealed and heard in state appellate courts by
the plaintiff and/or the auditor had their litigation costs significantly increased
by the lengthy appellate process.5 6 However, only two of these defendant
auditors had to pay the plaintiff, after several years, at least at the end of round
one (in a few cases round two) of the state appellate process. 7
The greatest significance of these outcomes for both the accounting and
legal professions is the close split in the outcomes of the decisions. This near
split, a twenty-six to twenty-three difference, and a slight twelve-eleven-three
edge for auditors when the cases are aligned by jurisdictions, is an example
of a pattern of what commentators have called the "diffusion" of a significant

was substantive doctrine. In a substantial majority of the procedural cases, the appellate court reversed, and
because the appropriate substantive doctrine was highly controversial during this decade, see infra notes
77-105 and accompanying text, reversal occurred in a majority of these cases.
52
For well known discussions of the identification of legally significant facts by appellate courts,
and their influence on the appeal outcome, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY, 42-52, 58-69 (1960), and RUGGERO J. ALDiSERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS - A GUIDE TO
CLEAR LEGAL THINKING, 226-229 (1989). For a good example, of the impact of the identification of a
legally significant fact on the outcome of one of the auditor malpractice appeals evaluated in this study, see
discussion infra, notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
53
See infra notes 102-04, 109 and accompanying text.
5
See supra note 15 and accompanying text, with respect to the reason why 'interest analysis" was
a component of the assessment of "favorable."
55
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d. 784 (Mont. 1990) (the court upheld the basic damage award of over
$300,000 against the audit firm, but remanded because of improper award of prejudgment interests). See
also Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (client wins
and appellate court affirms three million dollar judgment against auditor).
%
See, e.g., Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1987) (parties conduct
discovery for several years). See Trubek, et. al, supranote 1, at 91 (discussing the costs of civil litigation
and finding that the overwhelming proportion of litigation costs were the lawyers' fees).
57
See supra note 55, and accompanying text.
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change in a common law doctrine." It serves as a signal to both professions
that state appellate courts have not yet reached a consensus on what is the
current proper accommodation of the conflicting interests presented by a
client lawsuit against an auditor, but even more particularly a suit by a third
party. The remainder of this section identifies and evaluates auditor and
lawyer perspectives that might account for this lack of consensus, and hence
the close split in the outcomes of these cases.
C. Auditor Perspective - Client Solvency & Case Outcomes

The solvency of the client is a factor that the accounting profession has
identified as significant as to whether a lawsuit will be filed against an auditor,
especially by a third party non-client - the consensus is that client insolvency
prompts lawsuits against auditors. 9 The cases that have reached the state
supreme courts and selected state intermediate appellate courts support this
view. In only five of the third party plaintiff cases (35 of the 49 cases in the
study), where evidence of solvency/insolvency appeared in the case report, did
that evidence warrant concluding that the client was still solvent.' This study

5s

Porter and Tarr, supra note 7, at xxi. For a survey of the various patterns of "diffusion" of "tort

reform" doctrines, see Baum and Canon, supra note 7 (authors document that the state supreme courts since
World War II have generally made all kinds of classes of defendants more vulnerable to successful tort
litigation).
S9
C. Scott Smith, Deep Pockets, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING BULLETIN, May 1992, at 2. See
supra note 1.
60
In Harper v. Inkster Public Schools., 404 N.W.2d 776, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), and
Demetracopoulosv. Wilson, 640 A.2d 279, 281-82 (N.H. 1994), the third party plaintiff was the business
manager of the audit firm's client, it was clear that the client school district and non-profit corporation
remained solvent/viable. In Brown v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W. 2d 742, 743-44 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) limited partners filed a counterclaim against its managing partner (who had originally filed the
declaratory lawsuit) and other defendants, including the audit firm. The managing partner, a corporation,
was apparently still solvent at the time of the litigation. In GrantThorton v. Windsor House, Inc., 566
N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (Ohio 1991), the client was a solvent state government agency, the Ohio Department
of Public Welfare. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance.Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 452 N.W.2d 746, 749
(Neb. 1990), the client's solvency at the time of trial wasn't as clear. The insurance company alleged in
its petition that it was the surety on the debts of the audit firm's client, and that it "would be" damaged in
excess of ten million dollars. The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted that allegation to mean that
sometime in the future the plaintiff would suffer an injury. Hence the allegation suggest that at some point
in the future, but not now, the audit firm's client would be unable to pay its debts.
Evidence was present in other cases: Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390
(Ala. 1989) (client defaulted on loan to third party plaintiff and filed for bankruptcy); Bily v. Arthur Young,
834 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1992) (client filed for bankruptcy prior to filing of lawsuit); First Fla. Bank v. Max
Mitchell, & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1990) (auditor's client defaulted on repayment of $500,000 line of
credit to this plaintiff); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. 1987) (auditor's client filed
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has documented, however, that the insolvency of the client was not a good
predictor of the outcome of these third party cases when they reached the state
appellate courts. This is evident by the twenty to fifteen edge in the auditors'
favor.61
It is also true that in about half of the lawsuits where the clients were
plaintiffs, the clients were either insolvent or at least in serious financial

for bankruptcy); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 721 (Idaho 1989)
(auditor's client placed in receivership); Huls v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ill.
App.
Ct. 1989) (third party plaintiff purchased auditor's client); Brumley v. Touche Ross & Co., 487 N.E. 2d
641 (111.App. Ct. 1985) (third party plaintiff purchased auditor's client); Eldred v. McGladrey, 468 N.W.2d
s client in bankruptcy proceedings); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988) (auditor's
client insolvent); Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982) (auditor's client, a savings and loan,
collapsed); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1983) (auditor's client survived
long enough to pay part of judgment based on same facts in a separate litigation, but then filed for
bankruptcy); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (auditor's
client, a bank, declared insolvent); Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (no
indication of client's on-going solvency); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784,787,793-994 (Mont 1990) (audit
firm's client insolvent, but substantial evidence presented at trial that the client was insolvent at the time
of the audit that gave rise to the litigation, and the audit firm failed to identify that insolvency); H.
Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 141 (N.J. 1983) (auditor's client purchased plaintiff's company
principally by giving the plaintiff stock which subsequently proved worthless when the client filed for
bankruptcy shortly after the merger); Security Pac. Bus. Credit Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597
N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (N.Y. 1992) (audit firm's client filed for bankruptcy); Westpac Banking Corp. v.
Deschamps, N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y. 1985) (auditor's client "collapsed"); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur
Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110, 112 (N.Y. 1985) (auditor's client filed for bankruptcy after defaulting on
millions of dollars in loans made to it by plaintiffs); European American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs &
Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E. 2d 110, 113 (N.Y., 1985)(auditor's client filed for bankruptcy between the time the
complaint was first filed and the filing of the motion for summary judgment by the defendant auditor);
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 612 (N.C. 1988) (auditor's client owed plaintiff an
excess of $2,000,000 which it apparently failed to pay); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436
N.E.2d 212, 213 (Ohio 1982) (auditor's clients collapsed); United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Fought, 630
P.2d 337, 339 (Or. 1981) (auditor's client defaulted on over $1,000,000 in loans made to it by the plaintiff);
First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D. 1986) (auditor's client filed
for bankruptcy); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tenn. 1991) (auditor's
client insolvent); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(auditor's client insolvent); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Va. 1993) (third party plaintiff
was sole stockholder of audient which was in the process of being purchased by another company); First
Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989) (auditor's client made loan from
plaintiff bank that it apparently failed to completely repay); Imark Ind. Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 436
N.W.2d 311, 314 (Wis. 1989) (auditor's client bankrupt-defaulted on loans made by plaintiff); Citizens
State Bank v. Tinm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361,362 (Wis. 1983) (auditor's client defaulted on loans
made by plaintiff, eventually becoming insolvent and was liquidated.)
6'
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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trouble.6"
Yet, six of the fourteen decisions were favorable to the
auditors/defendants.63
D. Auditor Perspective - Firm Size & Case Outcomes
The size of an auditing firm is a factor that the accounting profession has
identified as significant in judging whether a lawsuit will be filed against the
auditor. The consensus among commentators is that fewer lawsuits are filed
against larger auditing firms." The "Big Six" (previously the "Big Eight")
firms, however, were the defendants in over half of the auditor liability cases
in this study.65 Financial resources may account for the disproportionate

62

Hydroculture Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 848 P.2d 856, 859 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (client filed

for bankruptcy prior to first filing a claim against the audit finn); Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 924 (client
apparently solvent); Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278 (Fla.3d
DCA 1989)(client, Archdiocese, solvent); Devco Premium Finance Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 456 So.
2d 1216, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (client liquidated); Holland v. Arthur Anderson, 571 N.E.2d 777 (11].
App. Ct. 1991) (client, insurance holding company, bankrupt) (formerly 127 111.App.3d 854, Il. App. Ct.
1984); First Nat'l Bank v. Brumleve and Dabbs, 539 N.E.2d 877, 878-70 (l. App. Ct. 1989) (client alleged
it suffered "huge losses", but apparently still solvent); Local 1064 v. Ernst & Young, 516 N.W.2d 492, 493
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (labor union/client loss was limited to amount reflected in higher percentage
contribution that state employment agency required-remained on-going entity); Jaffe v. Harris, 338 N.W.2d
228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (Client, book company, apparently remained solvent); Lincoln Grain, Inc. v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Neb. 1984) (client, closed its division, the value of whose assets
were in question); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984) (client, husband as part of divorcing
couple, businesses' apparently remain solvent); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206, 207 (Ohio
1989) (client, investment trusts, lose all of the investments); University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney,
773 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (client bank despite substantial losses apparently remained
solvent); Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing Inc. 744 S.W.2d 170, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(client bankrupt); Seaward Int'l, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Va. 1990) (despite
incurring substantial tax liability, client apparently remained solvent).
63
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
6
But see supra note 1 (suggesting that the largest accounting firms have bome the financial brunt
of the increased litigation against auditing firms). A recent report of the results of a "liability" survey of
mid-size and smaller accounting firms stated that the median claim against such firms was $155,000, and
slightly less than half said that their firm's exposure to legal liability had increased in the last five (1987-92)
years. See Survey Shows Extent of Members Concern Over Legal Liability, July 1992, at 1. For a like
perception of the trend of filing lawsuits against large law firms see Couric, supra note 1, at 65 (noting that
in the last decade large law firms are more frequently the target of malpractice lawsuits, because they are
seen as the deep pocket).
65
Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 922; Hydroculture Inc., 848 P.2d at 856; Bily, 834 P.2d at 745;
Coopers & Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 777; Brumley v.
Touche Ross, 487 N.E.2d 641 (11. App. Ct. 1985); Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982) (Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. party defendant); Local 1064, 516 N.W.2d 492(Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Harper
v. Inkster Pub. Schs., 404 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (Arthur Anderson & Co. party defendant);
Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228 (Arthur Young & Co. party defendant); Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 720; Touche Ross
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representations of the large auditing firms in these cases because they had the
finances to appeal the law suit through the legal system.66 The fact that the
defendants were "Big Six" firms did not have a significant impact on the
outcomes of these cases. A total of fourteen decisions (including eight state
supreme court decisions) were decided in favor of the "Big Six" firms whereas
the plaintiffs secured favorable decisions in thirteen cases (including nine
state supreme court decisions) when pitted against such firms.67
In the remaining decisions, those in which non-"Big Six" firms were the
defendants, twelve decisions were favorable to defendant auditors, and ten
decisions were favorable to plaintiffs.68 Thus, "Big Six" firms and non-"Big

& Co., 514 So.2d at 315; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 746; Lincoln Grain, Inc., 345
N.W.2d at 300; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 138 (Touche Ross & Co. party defendant); Security Pac.
Bus. Credit,Inc., 597 N.E.2d at 1080; CreditAlliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 110; InvestorsReit One, 546
N.E.2d at 207 (Coopers & Lybrand party defendant); Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 212; FirstNat'l
Bank of Minneapolis, 394 N.W.2d at 709 (Touche Ross & Co. party defendant); Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
822 S.W.2d at 592; Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 743-44; University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707; Blue Bell
Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 408; Ward,435 S.E.2d at 628; SeawardInt'l Inc., 391 S.E.2d at 283; Imark Indus. Inc.,
436 N.W.2d at 311.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67
The fourteen decisions that favored "Big Six" auditors were: Bily, 834 P.2d at 745; Coopers
& Lybrand, 536 So. 2d at 278; Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 777; Brueck, 638 P.2d at 904 (Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. party defendant); Harper, 404 N.W.2d at 776 (Arthur Anderson & Co. party defendant);
Jaffe, 338 N.W.2d at 228 (Arthur Young & Co. party defendant); Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 720; Touche Ross
& Co., 514 So. 2d at 315; Security Pac.Bus. Credit Inc., 597 N.E.2d at 1080; CreditAlliance Corp., 483
N.E.2d at 110; and FirstNat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 394 N.W.2d at 709 (Touche Ross & Co. party
defendant); Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 742; UniversityNat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 707; and Seaward Int'l Inc.,
391 S.E.2d at 283.
The thirteen decisions that were favorable to plaintiffs were: Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 922; Hydroculture
Inc., 848 P.2d at 856; Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 641; Local 1064, 516 N.W.2d 492; St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 746; Lincoln Grain,Inc., 345 N.W.2d at 300; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 138
(Touche Ross & Co. party defendant); Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d at 207 (Coopers & Lybrand party
defendant); Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 212; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 592; Blue
Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 408; Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 628, and Imark Ind. Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 311.
68
The twelve decisions favorable to non-big six audit firms were: Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So.
2d at 390; Devco Premium Finance Co., 456 So. 2d at 1216; Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 198; Idaho
Bank & Trust Co., 772 P.2d at 770; Huls, 535 N.E.2d at 72; Eldred, 468 N.W.2d at 218; Pahre,422
N.W.2d at 178; Mid-American Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563, Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 437;
Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d at 279; Westpac Banking Corp., 484 N.E.2d at 1351; and GrantThorton, 566
N.E.2d at 1220.
The ten decisions favorable to plaintiffs when they filed against non-big six firms were: First Fla. Bank,
558 So. 2d at 9; FirstNat. Bank, 539 N.E.2d at 877; Thayer, 793 P.2d at 784; Levine, 478 A.2d at 397;
EuropeanAmerican Bank & Trust Co., v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d at 110; Raritan River Steel
Co., 367 S.E.2d at 609; United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 630 P.2d at 337; Greenstein, Logan & Co., 744
S.W.2d at 170; FirstNat'l Bank ofBluefield, 386 S.E.2d at 310; Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 361.
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Six" firms fared about the same in these state appellate decisions in which
they were the auditor/defendants.
E. Lawyer Perspective - Third Party Plaintiff's Theory of the Case and
Case Outcomes
Experienced lawyers recognize that lawsuits filed against auditors are
ultimately the result of strategic decisions made by the lawyers for the
plaintiff and defendant. 9 The plaintiff's "blue print" is referred to as "the
theory(ies) of the case", which this article identifies as the cause(s) of action
identified in the plaintiff's complaint.7"
In the state supreme court decisions and the intermediate appellate court
decisions in which a third party plaintiff filed the lawsuit, attorneys for the
third party plaintiffs filed complaints which alleged multiple causes of
action." In all but one of these cases, the complaint included the claim that

69
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(1992) (listing current fundamental lawyer skills as development, implementation, and continuing
reassessment of the planning process); See also Roger A. Parkinson, Better Case Results From Improving
Planningand Managing, 432 PLI/Lit 403 (1992).
70
Legal Education and Professional Development, supra note 69, at 138 (listing among the
second set of fundamental lawyer skills as formulating, elaborating, and evaluating legal theories); GEORGE
VETTER, SUCCESSFUL CIVIL LITIGATION 21 (1977)

(defining theory of the case as the identification of the most persuasive facts available to convince the jury
of the cause of action). The defendant usually answers with defense theories in light of the plaintiff's theory
of the case. Peter N. Sheridan, Three Keys To the Successful Defense of Litigation of Precedential
Importance: Preparation, Preparation, Preparation, 455 PLLIT 9 (1993); Defending the Professional
(1982); Defending the Professional, Practicing Law Institute, 1982.
71
ColonialBank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 392 (negligence, wantonness, breach of contract, and
fraud/breach of fiduciary warranties); Bily, 834 P.2d at 748-49 (fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
"professional negligence"); FirstFla.Bank, 558 So. 2d at 11 (FIa. 1990) (negligence, gross negligence, and
fraud); Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 199 (negligence); Idaho Bank & Trust Co, 772 P.2d at 721
(negligence); Huls, 535 N.E.2d at 74 (fraudulent concealment, willful misconduct, and fraudulent
misrepresentation); Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 642 (negligence); Eldred,468 N.W.2d at 219 (fraudulent,
negligent, and innocent misrepresentation); Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 179 (Iowa 1988) (negligence); Brueck,
638 P.2d at 907 (negligence, gross negligence, breach of state securities law, and breach of express and
implied warranties); Harper,404 N.W.2d at 776 (negligence); Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 724 (negligence,
breach of contract, sale of unregistered securities, fraudulent sale of securities, statutory consumer fraud,
and statutory false advertising); Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 315 (gross negligence); Mid-American
Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 564 (breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation); Lindner Fund,
770 S.W.2d at 438 (negligence and gross negligence); Thayer, 793 P.2d at 786 (negligence and negligent
misrepresentation); St. PaulFire & Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 748 (negligent misrepresentation,
negligence); Demetracopoulos, 640 A.2d at 281 (intentional interference with contractual relations,
negligence, and defamation); H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 141 (negligence, gross negligence, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and breach of warranties); Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 597 N.E.2d at 1081
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the auditor had performed negligently and/or had made negligent
misrepresentations in the audit report.72
In the state supreme court decisions in which negligence and/or negligent
misrepresentation was claimed by the third party plaintiff, twelve decisions
upheld the possibility that the plaintiff might recover, and fifteen rejected that
possibility.73 The California Supreme Court "split the baby," eliminating the
possibility that the plaintiffs could recover on negligence, but preserved the
74
opportunity for negligent misrepresentation recovery.

(negligence); Westpac Banking Corp., 484 N.E.2d at 1352 (negligence and gross negligence); Credit
Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 112 (negligence and fraud); European American Bank & Trust Co., v.
Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y., 1985)(separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit
Alliance, decided same day with Credit Alliance, hence with same citation. negligence and gross
negligence); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d at 611 (negligent misrepresentation and breach
of contract); Grant Thorton v. Windsor House, Inc., 566 N.E.2d at 1221 (counterclaims included breach
of contract, fraud, libel, malpractice, and negligence); Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 213
(professional malpractice, breach of contract, concealment, fraud and deceit); UnitedStates Nat'l Bank of
Or., 630 P.2d at 338 (fraudulent misrepresentation and a deceit claim); FirstNat'l Bank of Minneapolis,
394 N.W.2d at 709 (negligence and fraud); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at (Tenn. 1991)
(negligence); Brown, 856 S.W.2d at 745 (malpractice, negligence, negligence per se, negligent
misrepresentation, and gross negligence); Blue Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 410 (negligent misrepresentation,
fraud, breach of warranties, and breach of fiduciary duty); Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 630 (breach k of Bluefield,
386 S.E.2d at 311 (professional negligence); Imark Ind. Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 313 (negligent
misrepresentation); Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 362 (negligence, reckless preparation of financial
statements).
72
See supra note 71. The only decision in which the plaintiff's attorney's theory of the case
didn't include negligence or negligent misrepresentation was Huls v. Gunderson, 535 N.E.2d 72,74 (111.
App. Ct., 1989) (fraudulent concealment, willful misconduct, and fraudulent misrepresentation).
73
The possibility of the third party plaintiff succeeding on the negligence cause(s) of action was
upheld in the following twelve state supreme court decisions: FirstFla. Bank, 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
Thayer, 793 P.2d at 784; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 746; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461
A.2d at 138; EuropeanAm. Bank & Trust Co., 483 N.E.2d at 110; RaritanRiver Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at
609; Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 212; United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 630 P.2d at; Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 592; FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefield, 386 S.E.2d at 310; Imark Indus. Inc., 436
N.W.2d at 311; Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 361.
The state supreme court decisions rejecting the possibility of the third party plaintiff succeeding on the
negligence causes of action were: Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 390; Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d
at 198; Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 772 P.2d at 720; Eldred, 468 N.W.2d at 219; Pahre, 422 N.W.2d at 178;
Brueck, 638 P.2d at 904; Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 720; Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 315;
Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d at 281; Security Pac.Bus. CreditInc., 597 N.E.2d at 1085; Westpac Banking
Corp., 484 N.E.2d at 1351; CreditAlliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 110; GrantThorton, 566 N.E.2d at 1222;
-26 (showing that the overall favorable outcome count for audit firms versus third parties was 15-13). See
infra notes 74 and 76 (discussing the two decisions which accounted for the slight outcome difference
between the overall favorable outcome count and the outcome split with respect to the negligence claim
reported in this note).
74
Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
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The six intermediate appellate decisions in which the third party plaintiff

alleged a negligence claim split four to two in favor of the audit firms
concerning sanctioning the possibility of recovery on the negligence and/or
negligent misrepresentation causes of action.7 5 Hence, the split of these
appellate courts in deciding the viability of a negligence claim by a third party
plaintiff (fifteen decisions sanctioned at least some possibility and nineteen
decisions rejected such a possibility) coincides with the same relatively close
split in the overall outcomes of these decisions, and may be a significant
reason for these courts being so divided, especially if the courts accept or
reject the third par reasons.76
In twenty-five of these thirty-four decisions, a key issue was identical: the
scope of the duty owed by auditors when a third party plaintiff claimed a
negligent audit and resulting injury.77 These state appellate courts arguably
7s
The two decisions favorable to third party plaintiffs with respect to the negligence claim were:
Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 641; and Blue Bell, Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 408. The four decisions favorable to
auditors with respect to the negligence claim were: Harper,404 N.W.2d at 776; Mid-American Bank &
Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563; Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 437; and Brown, 856 S.W. 2d at 742.
76
The significance of the appellate courts' evaluation of the plaintiff's negligence claim is
heightened since that the courts dismissed the other causes of action alleged by the third party plaintiffs.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Fraud causes of action were dismissed in several of these cases.
First, there are instances when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed a fraud cause of action. See, e.g., First
Fla. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 11 (Fla. 1990). Second, courts dismissed actions by relying on the same scope
of the duty owed evaluation. See, e.g., ColonialBank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 396; but see FirstFla. Bank,
558 So. 2d at 14. Third, in decisions such as Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d at 748-749, the court struck
down a viable claim of fraud by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the auditing firm intentionally misled
the third party by omissions or overt statements made in the report. By requiring this level of culpability,
the decision departed sharply from Justice Cardozo's view on the viability of a fraud claim in the seminal
Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444(N.Y., 1931). Cardozo ruled that the fraud claim could be pursued
by the third party creditor against an auditor without the plaintiff having to prove the same duty nexus, and
without proving deliberate deception as long as the plaintiff could prove either assertions of facts without
knowledge to support those facts or misstatement of fact reasonably relied upon.
The courts also dismissed contract causes of action. The plaintiffs were unable to convince the juries
that the auditing firm and the clients intended that the third party benefit by the audit agreement. See, e.g.,
Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 395-96; Grant Thorton, 566 N.E.2d at 1223. However, in Ward v.
Ernst & Young, the court rejected plaintiff's professional negligence claim and restored his possibility of
recovering on a third party beneficiary contract claim. In this case, the third party plaintiff was the sole
stockholder of the audit firm's client, and the audit firm allegedly knew that a sale of his stock was pending
at the time of the audit. In Bily v. Arthur Young, one of two cases where the privity standard was adopted,
the California Supreme Court also recognized the possibility of third party recovery on a contract theory,
at 767 (n.16). See also, infra note 107 and accompanying text.
"
Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 392-95; Bily, 834 P.2d at 752; First Fla. Bank, 558 So.
2d at 12-14; Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 199-200; Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 772 P.2d at 721-22;
Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 643-45; Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 179-81; Harper,404 N.W.2d at 777-79; Touche
Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 318-23; Mid-American Bank & Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d at 564-66; Lindner Fund,
770 S.W.2d at 438-39; Thayer, 793 P.2d at 786; Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d at 282; H. Rosenblum Inc.,
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had five options.7" First, a court could retain or adopt the historical privity
standard, which was most notably articulated by Justice Cardozo in
Ultramaresv. Touche.79 The Ultramaresopinion provides the most protective
standard to auditors by asserting that auditors do not owe a duty to any third
party, except for those who pay for such a duty. Other options, which reflect
standards which provide progressively less protection for auditors, are the
"near privity" standard 0 , the "foreseen standard," (as stated in the
Restatement)"1 , the "reasonably foreseeable" standard 2, and the "reasonably
461 A.2d at 142-53; Security Pac. Bus. Credit, 597 N.E.2d at 1083-84; Westpac Banking Corp., 484
N.E.2d at 1352-53; Credit Alliance Corp., 483 N.E.2d at 114-119; EuropeanAm. Bank & Trust Co., 483
N.E.2d at 120; Raritan River Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 614-618; Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 21415; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 92; Blue Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 411-12; Ward, 435 S.E.2d at
631-33; FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefield, 386 S.E.2d at 311-313; Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 364-66.
The cases in which the scope of the duty standard was not the key issue on appeal were: Eldred,468
N.W.2d at 219 (no proof of reliance on audit firm report by the third party); Brueck, 638 P.2d at 904
(selection of appropriate statute of limitations as decisive issue); Jenson, 335 N.W.2d at 720 (applicability
of statutory causes of action); St. Paul Fire& Marine Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d at 748-49 (insurance company,
surety for audit firm client, failed to properly plead that they had currently suffered damages. Given
opportunity to replead by Nebraska Supreme Court); Grant Thorton, 566 N.E.2d at 1222 (applicable statute
of limitations for accounting malpractice is four years and no use of "discovery" rule); United States Nat'l
Bank of Or., 630 P.2d at 337 (elements of cause of actions for misrepresentation and deceit); First Nat'l
Bank of Minneapolis,394 N.W.2d at 709 (proof that damages were caused by auditor negligence); Brown,
856 S.W.2d at 746-748 ("discovery" accrual date rule doesn't apply to accountant malpractice claims when
the plaintiff is a third party by curiously using as a key justification an analysis of the scope of the duty an
accountant should owe to a third party); and Imark Indus. Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 311 (auditor reliance and
proportioning damages among joint tortfeasors).
79
But See supra note 74 (discussing how California Supreme Court demonstrated that more than
one of these standards could be adopted in a single case)
79
Ultramares,174 N.E. at 444. See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the recent
judicial reluctance in adopting this standard). See Richard Miller, Public Accountants and Attorneys:
Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 568 (1972) (providing commentary on the
Ultramares standard). See Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for
Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L REV. 233 (1983) (a critical view of the Ultramares
standard). See Kenneth Davis, Accountant's Liabilityfor Negligently Certifying FinancialReports: The
Legacy of Ultramaresv. Touche, 64 N.Y.ST.BJ. 30 (Oct. 1992) (an unfavorable evaluation of Ultramares
by a New York practitioner).
W
See infra note 87 (identifying jurisdictions whose state appellate courts adopted or retained this
standard during the period 1980-94). With respect to recent commentary evaluating most/all of the
competing duty standards see: See Duke, supranote 9; Thomas Shroyer, Accountants and The Dynamics
of Duty, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 495-96 (1987) (an evaluation of competing duty standards).
81
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977). See infra note 91 (identifying jurisdictions whose
state appellate courts adopted or retained this standard during the period 1980-94). With respect to
commentary evaluating this standard, See Shroyer, supra note 80, at 496-97.
82
See infra note 96(identifying jurisdictions whose state appellate courts adopted this standard
during the period 1980-94. With respect to commentary evaluating this standard, See Thomas L Gossman,
IMC v. Butler: A Case For Expanded ProfessionalLiabilityfor Negligent Misrepresentation?,26 AM.
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foreseeable/policy evaluation" standard based on a weighing of interests.8 3
Only one of twenty-five decisions retained the strict "privity" standard. 4
The California Supreme Court first applied a policy-analysis approach, and
this approach resulted in deciding upon the strict "privity" standard for third
party negligence, but not negligent misrepresentation claims.85 Both courts
felt that auditors still needed the protection of the privity standard, and that the
legitimate interests of potential third party users of the audit could be
protected by alternative methods.8 6
Four state supreme courts have adopted or applied the "near privity" duty
rule. 7 This standard limits the auditor's duty to situations where the auditor
knows a purpose of the audit is to influence a third party, and the auditor
directly and voluntarily contacts the eventual third party plaintiff, thereby
evidencing an understanding that this third party will rely on the audit report.88
Bus. LAw J. 99, 100 (1988)(unfavorable); Shroyer, supra note 80 at 497-500; Weiner, supra note 79
(favorable).
93
See infra notes 100-101(identifying jurisdictions whose state appellate courts adopted this
standard during the period 1980-94, and those incorporating policy/interest analysis as part of their
reasonably foreseeable test, and/or that used policy analysis in its reasoning that led to the dismissal of the
claim of a particular kind of third party).
94
Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 631-33 (Va. 1993) Seee.g., Ark. Code Ann. s. 17-12702 (1987) (auditors only liable to those not in privity to whom he sends a copy of a writing sent to a client
acknowledging that intent of the audit is to benefit that third party).
85
Bily, 834 P.2d at 767. See infra notes 100-101.
'6
Ward, 435 S.E.2d at 631-33 (briefly acknowledging that eighteen states had adopted the
Restatement standard, and ignoring the rejection of the strict privity standard even in New York, whose
Court of Appeals had founded it, and rejecting the possibility of distinguishing accountants duty to third
parties from that of other professionals). But see supra note 76 (discussing Ward which demonstrates that
even if a court adheres to the privity standard, facts that satisfy the nexus of the near privity standard, may
result in a possible recovery on a third party beneficiary contract theory). See also discussion infra note
139 and accompanying text. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767. (California Supreme Court's adoption of the
Restatement Second Standard for Negligent Misrepresentation claims). Because competent future
California third party claimants's lawyers will read Bily and plead negligent misrepresentation, this article
in its jurisdictional count, identifies California as a jurisdiction adopting the Restatement Second Standard,
see infra notes 91-95. See also, Davis, supra note 79, at 35.
87
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank
& Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784,
789 (Mont. 1990) ("modified version" of near privity standard doesn't require specific jury instruction that
the audit firm must have voluntarily contacted the specific third party plaintiff). Security Pac. Bus. Credit
Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1083-84 (N.Y. 1992); Westpac Banking Corp. v.
Deschamps, 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1352-53 (N.Y. 1985); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d
110, 114-119 (N.Y. 1985); European American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110,
120(N.Y., 1985)(separate case consolidated for appeal with Credit Alliance)
U
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So.2d 390, 394 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank &
Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720,722 (Idaho, 1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784,791
(Mont., 1990) ('"modified version" of near privity standard doesn't require specific jury instruction that the
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The rationale that most commonly appeared in these decisions for adopting
the near privity standard was that this standard was the best way to preserve
the policy wisdom of Ultramares.s9 In only two of the seven cases, was a
third party able to allege facts that could establish that the auditing firm
voluntarily contacted it with respect to transmittal of the audit report in order
to influence that third party. 90

audit firm must have voluntarily contacted the specific third party plaintiff. As long as there is evidence
that the audit firm knew, at the time of preparing the audit report, that a purpose of the audit was to
influence the specific third party plaintiff with regard to a specific transaction(s), and that the specific third
party would be relying on the audit report in doing business with the audit firm's client); Security Pacific
Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1083-84 (N.Y., 1992); Westpac
Banking Corp. v. Deschamps (and Seidman & Seidman), 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1352-53 (N.Y., 1985); Credit
Alliance v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y., 1985); European American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y., 1985)(Case reviewed and decided in same opinion
as Credit Alliance)
s9
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So.2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank &
Trust Co. v. First Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho, 1989) (no clear rationale expressly stated);
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 789 (Mont., 1990) (Since under the facts of the case, the outcome would
be the same no matter which of the three scope of duty standard was adopted, court found no need to
consider adopting more "liberal" standards); Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main
& Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (N.Y., 1992); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps (and Seidman &
Seidman), 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (N.Y., 1985); Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110, 115116, and 118 (N.Y., 1985); European American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d
110, 120 (N.Y., 1985).
90
In Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 790 (Mont., 1990), the audit firm met with the third party
plaintiff, and knew that a purpose of the audit was to influence this third party to buy the audit firm's client.
See supra note 88 for an explanation of why the Montana Supreme Court thought it unnecessary that the
jury be expressly instructed on the need for such voluntary direct contact by the audit firm of the specific
third party plaintiff. In European American Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, Etc., 483 N.E.2d 110,
113 and 120 (N.Y., 1985) the third party plaintiff alleged it was the principal lender to the auditor's client,
and that the auditor knew that throughout the period in question, of this relationship and the plaintiffs
reliance on the audited financials to make the lending decisions, and that representatives of the plaintiff and
the auditing firm met on several occasions to discuss the accuracy of the audit.
In Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So.2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989) (third party plaintiff
unable to allege facts to even prove that the audit firm knew at any time that the audit report was to be used
to influence a specific third party); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. Fst Bankcorp. of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720, 722
(Idaho, 1989) (case remanded to trial court to apply "Credit Alliance" standard to facts); Security Pacific
Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1085-86 (N.Y., 1992) (audit firm
knew that the plaintiff would rely on the audit report, but the plaintiff initiated contact with the audit firm
was deemed insufficient to satisfy the third element of Credit Alliance - voluntary contact with the third
party plaintiff initiated by the audit firm. This application of the near privity standard by the New York
Court of Appeals appears to require that the audit firm must at least by implication assume the risk of
liability to a third party before the court will find that the audit firm owed a duty to that third party. Hence
this standard may require more proof than that required to establish thi d party beneficiary contract liability,
see discussion, supra note 76); Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps (and Seidman & Seidman) (auditing
firm knew that audit was needed to seek a "bridge loan", but didn't know a specific lender, including this
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Twelve jurisdictions' state appellate courts, including nine state supreme
courts, in thirteen decisions adopted or retained the Restatement Second of
Torts, Section 552 "foreseen" third party scope of the auditor's duty
standard.9 This standard extends auditor liability to the class of third parties
that the auditor knew were to be supplied with the audited financials for
guidance or information, or at least knew that the client intended to supply the
audit report and accompanying statements to a limited class of such third
parties.92 The rationale that most frequently appeared in these decisions for
third party plaintiff would be approached to provide the loan), 484 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (N.Y., 1985); Credit
Alliance v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110, 119 (N.Y., 1985) (plaintiff creditor failed to allege any
"linking facts", or even that the auditor knew at time of undertaking the engagement that purpose of the
audit was to influence this plaintiff or any other specific third party).
91
Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745,769 (Cal. 1992). See supra note 86 (providing an explanation as to why this case is categorized as a Rstmt. case); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell, & Co., 558 So.
2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199-200 (Ga. 1987); Brumley v. Touche
Ross, 487 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Il. App. Ct. 1985).; Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa
1988); Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563, 564-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Demetracopoulos v. Wilson, 640
A.2d 279, 282 (N.H. 1994); Raritan River Steel Co.v. Cherry 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C; 1988); Haddon
View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ohio 1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst
& Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408,
411-12 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va.
1989).
92
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Section 552:
Information Negligently Supplied for
The Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or employment, or in any other transaction in
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to
supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it, and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or know
that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty give the information extends to loss suffered by any
of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created; in any of the transactions in which it is
intended to protect them.
Comment "h" to this section made clear that the auditor didn't have to know of the identify of the
eventual plaintiff, provided the auditor knew that the purpose of the audit was to influence a specific class
of persons. Illustration "5" on the other hand, indicated that if the auditor knew that the audit was intended
for a specific person or entity, the scope of the duty extended only to that person. Illustration "10" which
also accompanied comment h indicated that if the auditor didn't know that any specific type of entity and/or
person was intended to receive and be influenced by the audit, no duty was owed to any third person who
received and relied upon it. Hence the restatement, depending on how these comments and illustrations
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adopting or retaining the Restatement Second standard was that in today's financial world, the courts and the accounting profession have accepted or should
accept that it is fair to impit firm when in fact it knows or should know that
93
the audit will be used to influence this third party/this type of third party.
In applying this standard, all but one of the seven decisions which found
in favor of the plaintiff, included allegations and proof by the third party
plaintiff that the auditing firm knew in preparing the audit that it was to be
used to influence either the plaintiff or a third party like the plaintiff, or came
to know of that fact, or knew from their work that the plaintiff was likely to
receive such a report. 9 In the six cases in which the appellate court applied
this standard and found for the defendant auditor, no such knowledge was
alleged, or plaintiff failed to preserve or arguably prove such knowledge.95
Three state supreme courts adopted the reasonably foreseeable scope of
an auditor's duty to third parties standard. 96 This standard provides potential
protection to a broader class of third party plaintiffs: those who the auditor

are accepted/interpreted, may be viewed as containing multiple scope of the liability to third party
standards. For confirmation, see infra note 93, documenting the nuances of the Restatement standard by
the decisions in this study.
93
Bily, 834 P.2d at 769 (audit firm on notice with respect to scope of potential third party
liability); First Fla. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 15-16 (auditors can acquire requisite knowledge after the
completion of the audit); Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 200; Brumley, 487 N.E.2d at 645 ( the influencing
of a third party need not be the primary original purpose for the audit); Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 180; Lindner
Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 438; Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d at 283 (audit report not prepared to benefit third
party plaintiff); RaritanRiver Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 617; Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 214-215;
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 593.
94
First Fla. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 16 (auditor subsequently came to know of use of the audit to
influence the specific plaintiff and reconfirmed its accuracy specifically to the plaintiff); Brumley, 487
N.E.2d at 645; Raritan River Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 618(allegations sufficient to show that the audit
would be used to influence third parties); Haddon View Inv. Co., 436 N.E.2d at 215; Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 593 (giving plaintiff chance to prove that the audit firm at least knew that its report
was to be used to influence the type of creditor represented by the plaintiff); Blue Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at
413 (auditor knew that plaintiff was an on going trade creditor of the client coupled with the fact that
multiple copies of the report were furnished the client); FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefteld, 386 S.E.2d at 311.
Bily, 834 P.2d at 774 (one plaintiff failed to cross-appeal from loss and intermediate affirmance
of negligent misrepresentation claim); Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 198; Pahre, 422 N.W.2d at 181;
(auditor's client required by state law to send audit report to state auditor); Mid-American Bank-& Trust
Co., 851 S.W.2d at 563, 565-66; (third party plaintiff was not within limited group to whom the accounting
firm owed a duty); Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 438; Demetracopoulos,640 A.2d at 283; (the audit was
not done to influence or benefit this any third party).
%
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322 (Miss. 1987); H.
Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,
335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
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should have anticipated as receivers/users of the audit.97 A key shared
rationale of the courts adopting this standard was the current recognition by
the accounting profession, federal and state governments, and the business
community that an audit is frequently paid for and then used by clients in
order to favorably influence others.9 8 In these decisions, the client's surety
against defalcations, a company being bought by the auditor's client, and a
creditor, all of whom acted in reliance on the audit, were found to arguably be
within the class of third parties whose reliance on the audit could have been
foreseen by the auditing firm.99
Two of these cases, however, held or implied that a direct examination of
policy/interest factors could result in a finding that the auditor should not be
held liable in the specific case, even if the third party plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable." These observations proved prophetic, when later, the only case
in this study which directly used poletermine the scope of an audit firm's duty
to a third party, and a second case that began its evaluation with. direct
policy/interest analysis, both concluded that the audit firm owed no duty in
negligence to the third party plaintiffs."' 1

Touche Ross & Co. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315, 322 (Miss., 1987); Rosenblaum
v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 147-153 (N.J., 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d
361, 366 (Wis., 1983).
n9
Touche Ross & Co. v. Comn. Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315, 322 (Miss., 1987); Rosenblaum
v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149-150 (N.J., 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d
361, 365 (n.10) (Wis., 1983). A second and third shared rationale relied upon by these courts was that
imposing the liability that results from this modem use of audits on auditors is fair - because auditors may
respond by reducing the risk of being sued by being more careful in preparing audits - the costs of this
greater care can then be passed on to clients and eventually to society; and that auditors can obtain
malpractice insurance to pay/help pay specific claims; See Touche Ross & Co. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co.,
514 So.2d 315, 322 (Miss.. 1987) (citing with approval these justifications as stated in Rosenblum);
Rosenblaum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 151, 153 (NJ., 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,
335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis., 1983).
9
Touche Ross & Co. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315, 323 (Miss., 1987)(Ultimately,
however, Mississippi Supreme Court decided against recovery for this third party plaintiff); Rosenblaum
v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 155 (NJ., 1983) (audit firm knew in fact of this plaintiff and use of the audit report
and financial statements in question, prior to the plaintiffs reliance); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
& Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 367 (Wis., 1983).
10D
H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 147 (by implication); Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 366
(express holding).
101 Harper v. lnkster Pub. Schs., 404 N.W.2d 776, 777-79 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (using a
policy/interest evaluation to hold that the audit firms not liable to key financial personnel of the client on
a negligence theory); Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745, 761-67 (Cal. 1992). See supra note 85
(discussing the court's conclusion after its policy analysis that the correct standard for negligence claims
of third parties generally was the traditional privity standard).
97
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These differences, therefore, in the scope of the duty standard selected by
the courts during the period 1980-94, is a significant factor in accounting for
the close outcome split of the third party plaintiff auditor liability cases. The
twenty-one states split almost symmetrically (1-4-12-3-1) in choosing one of
the five standards, well over half chose the middle ground, the Restatement
standard. When the privity or near privity standards were used, only two of
eight decisions were favorable to the third party plaintiff."° When the
Restatement Second standard was used, seven decisions were favorable to the
third party plaintiff, and six were favorable to the defendant audit firm. 3
When the reasonably foreseeable standard was used, two of three decisions
were favorable to the third party plaintiffs." Resorting to a policy evaluation
in determining whether a duty was owed to a third party, on the other hand,
produced a favorable result for the audit firm in the only case that applied it,
and it may not be as unfavorable a standard for auditors as heretofore
claimed. 5 Hence, the duty standard selected has significantly, but not
conclusively, influenced the court outcome with respect to the viability of
negligence claims. When the middle standard is chosen, for example, as one
might expect, the outcome is less predictable.
F. Lawyer Perspective - Client/PlaintiffsTheory of the Case and Case
Outcomes
Earlier this article reported a close edge favoring plaintiffs in cases in
which clients had sued auditors." 6 Unlike third party plaintiff cases, however,
it is more difficult to attribute this close split primarily to any obvious patterns
in how these courts reacted to aspects of the theories of the case chosen by
these client/plaintiffs. Those shared reactions that were observed are
identified in the following discussion.
First, clients have a stronger argument than third parties in alleging a
contract theory of a case, yet in only eight of fourteen cases was a contract
cause of action alleged. 1 7 In the eight cases where a contract cause of action

See
See
See
See

supra notes 85-86, and 90.
supra notes 94-95.
104
supra note 99.
105
supra note 101 and accompanying text. See Thomas Bilek, AccountantLiability to the
Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabrasi Approach, 39 Sw. L J. 689, 689-90 (1985) (arguing that
interest/policy evaluation disfavors the accountant).
106
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
1U7
Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 923, (Ala. 1987); Holland v. Arthur
Anderson, 571 N.E.2d 777,779 (Il. App. Ct. 1991); Local 1064 v. Ernst & Young, 516 N.W.2d 492, 493
102

103
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was alleged, seven clients also alleged a tort theory.' The contract theory of
the case paid dividends in five cases in which the courts found that the client
had a chance to arguably prove the contract claim, because the appellate court
' 9
sanctioned its survival despite the auditor's raising "tort defenses. '""

(Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Lincoln Grain Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Neb. 1984);
Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206, 207 (Ohio
1989); University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Seaward
Int'l Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Va. 1990).
In Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So.2d 922, 927 (Ala., 1987, the Alabama Supreme Court relied
on contract principles and policies in part based on a finding that the auditing firm expressly promised in
its engagement letter to conduct the audit in compliance with GAAS. Even when no express commitment
was made by the auditor to adhere to professional standards, a state appellate court held that there was an
implied promise to perform the work in accordance with current professional standards; Levine v. Wiss &
Co., 478 A.2d 397, 402 (N.J., 1984). See supra note 76 (explaining why third party plaintiffs have
difficulty successfully claiming breach of contract).
'10
Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 924 (court rejected defendant's claim that plaintiff plead a tort theory
for statute of limitations purposes); Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 779 (plaintiff alleged common law fraud as well
as breach of contract); Local 1064, 516 N.W.2d at 493 (client relied solely on contract theory); Lincoln
Grain, Inc., 345 N.W.2d at 304-305 (treated claim for purposes of the appeal as sounding in tort, because
parties so treated the claim at the trial level, despite plaintiff's original breach of contract allegation);
Levine, 478 A.2d at 398 (plaintiff alleged negligence as well as breach of agreement and breach of fiduciary
duty); Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d at 207 (fraud and negligence claims as well as breach of contract);
University Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 708 ( negligence and contract); SeawardInt'l Inc., 391 S.E.2d at 286
(negligence).
109
Blumberg, 514 So. 2d 924 (defendant's claim that plaintiff plead a tort theory rejected); Local
1064, 516 N.W.2d at 495 (rejected audit firm attempt to characterize the claim as malpractice for purpose
of identification of the correct statute of limitations); Levine, 478 A.2d at 398, 402 (rejecting immunity
defense to negligence claim, in part because the capacity in which the accountants acted, made it accurate
to characterize them as "creatures of contract")); Investors Reit One, 546 N.E.2d at 212 (client's other
theories of recovery survive despite the auditor's successful attack on the negligence claim with the
appropriate "tort" statute of limitations); Lincoln Grain Inc., 345 N.W.2d at 305-307 (plaintiff appeared
capable of proving the contract claim, but chose to argue the claim as a tort claim at trial. The Nebraska
Supreme Court still ruled in the client's favor limiting the role of contributory negligence, and also held that
the audit firm couldn't argue that a client assumes the risk of a negligent audit).
In the three decisions in which contract was alleged but the ultimate decision was favorable to the
defendant auditing firm, the client plaintiff lacked adequate evidence to prove its contract claim. Hence,
this left the tort claim susceptible to tort defenses. Holland, 571 N.E.2d at 779 (plaintiff failed to identify
in the complaint the specific nature of the breach of contract or the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff
attributable to that breach. This then left only the tort claim and the appellate court ruled that the
defendant's summary judgement motion should be granted when plaintiff failed to raise factual issues to
demonstrate how it was damaged by what it characterizes as fraud on the part of its auditors.); University
Nat'l Bank, 773 S.W.2d at 708 (the defendant had ended its practice of sending an engagement letter in
audits. Hence, the content of such a letter, and the bank's response was unavailable as the basis for the contract claim. In addition, deficiencies in defendant's audit work were not the source of the bank's complaint.
Instead allegations of the auditing firm's commitment to take on job of pseudo bank examiner was the basis
for the contract claim.- The court found inadequate proof by bank of such an enforceable commitment. The
appeals court upheld the application of comparative negligence doctrine to tort cause of action ); Seaward
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Decisions were favorable to auditors in three of six cases where clients
placed reliance only on a tort theory of recovery. These plaintiffs' causes of
action succumbed to "tort defense" unless they were able to prove or at least
allege a relatively flagrant violation of Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAAS) and/or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). t10 In summary, auditors won six of nine decisions when the client
did not allege, failed to prove, or did not rely throughout the appeal on a
contract claim, and none of the five decisions when such claim was alleged
and arguably proven. Hence, the allegation and proof by the client of a
contract theory of the case is a factor in accounting for the difference in the
outcomes of the client auditor liability cases during the period 1980-94.

Int'l Inc., 391 S.E.2d at 286 (audit firm made express promise in engagement letter to adhere to GAAS.
Plaintiff's trial audit expert failed to identify specific auditing standards violated by defendant).
li
Hydroculture Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 848 P. 2d 856, 860-61 (Ariz. App., 1992) (court
rejected audit firm claim that it owed no duty to its client that could be the bases of a negligence claim when
the dispute related to the validity of the audit firm's demand that GAAP required the client to remove
certain income items from its annual financial statements. Hence trial court committed error in granting
summary judgment to audit firm); Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustee of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d
278, 280 (n.1) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1989) (given nature of the audit only true basis for cause of action
against auditors was a breach of contract claim, yet plaintiff's pleading apparently alleged only auditor
malpractice/negligence. Reliance on only the negligence claim resulted in a comparative negligence finding,
coupled with the appellate court ruling that the scope of the damages must be furthered limited by requiring
that the plaintiff prove that the damages were not only foreseeable but would in fact have occurred given
the breach of the auditor's tort duty; id. at 281-82); Devco Premium Finance v. North River Ins. Co., 456
So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.,1984) (auditor malpractice only cause of action alleged by the
plaintiff.. Auditing firm may assert defense of comparative negligence when plaintiff's only theory/cause
of action is auditor malpractice, but if client had altered claim to breach of contract same defense would
have been unavailable to the defendant). In Fhst Nat. Bank v. Brumleve and Dabbs, 539 N.E.2d 877, 880
(1ll. App. Ct., 1989) the client plaintiff alleged only negligence, and survived an attempt for summary
judgment by the defendant auditor by alleging multiple facts purporting to document the omissions and
errors of the defendant auditor); Jaffe v. Harris, 338 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Mich. Ct. App., 1983) (fraud and
malpractice only causes of action alleged by plaintiff-limited partners of client partnership. Malpractice
claim is barred by tort/malpractice statute of limitations); In Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing,
744 S.W.2d 170, 185-86 (Tx. Ct. App., 1987), the plaintiff alleged only accountant malpractice/negligence.
Defendant auditor conceded after the trial failure to comply with GAAS. Plaintiff's verdict for over three
million dollars was upheld by intermediate appellate court despite appellate tort defense arguments that the
plaintiff was contributory negligent.
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Part 2 - The Recent Restatement of Auditor Common Law Liability
Decisions: Key Implications for the Accounting and Legal Professions
A. Lessons for Auditors
Earlier we identified two key auditor perspectives about malpractice
lawsuits filed against them.' One of these concerns was the escalating cost
of malpractice insurance.'12 The article has documented that the key decisions
of the last decade and one-half, 1980-94, resulted in only two final monetary
judgments against auditors.' These courts also did not exhibit an attitude
14
that it was proper for the auditor defendants to serve as the "deep pocket."'
These decisions therefore provide some evidence that the escalation of
malpractice insurance rates is not warranted by the outcomes or reasoning of
state appellate courts.11 5
The second auditor concern identified earlier in the article was whether
the judges recognized the complexity and difficulty of the audit function."t 6
The decisions of the state courts of last resort did show some sensitivity to the

I"'
112

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

1
See supra notes 55 and accompanying text.
1,4 Bily v. Arthur Young, 834 P.2d 745, 761 (Cal. 1992) (stating that if audit firm faces negligent
claims from all foreseeable third parties, its potential liability would be excessive); First Fla. Bank v. Max
Mitchell, & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla.1990); Eldred v. McGladrey, 468 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1991)
(expressing concern that auditors not be held liable to an unlimited class of third parties for an indeterminate amount); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322 (Miss. 1987)
(auditor firm is not the guarantor of the client's financial statements); Security Pac. Bus. Credit Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that the lender can not acquire additional loan protection simply by calling debtor's current audit firm and seeking reassurance that the financial statements are accurate); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 616 (N.C. 1988) (standard
limiting audit firm's potential liability is warranted because audit firm lacks control over distribution of its
report and some of the content contained therein. Imark Indus. Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 436 N.W.2d
311,315 (Wis. 1989) (plaintiff made covenants not to sue two principle officers of the audit firm's client
in exchange for their cooperation in the investigation of the audit, which resulted in a decision to sue the
audit firm for negligent misrepresentation). It should be noted that this sensitivity was demonstrated by
state supreme courts deciding against as well as those deciding the specific case in favor of the audit firm.
15

See supra note 14. See also Trubek, supra note 1, at 118-119 (questioning how insurance

companies, who set the malpractice rates, use the findings that civil defendants who persevere through the
trial stage fare better overall with respect to monetary outcome then those who do not).
116

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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complex nature of an audit engagement." 7 One of the better examples of this
sensitivity was a state supreme court holding, that notwithstanding the fact
that the third party plaintiff was within the class to whom the auditor owed a
duty, such a person must also prove all of the other elements of negligence."'
One of those elements is actual reliance by the third party plaintiff on the
audit." 9 The court held that a plaintiff/creditor can only prove reliance by
producing evidence that the audit report was examined prior to extending
credit to the auditor's client." This court reasoned that an audit report is
interdependent and hence can only be fully understood and justifiably relied
upon when considered in the context of the entire report, including any
qualifications of the auditor's opinion and any explanatory footnotes included
in the statements.' The court held that the plaintiff was not reasonable in
relying on a secondary source's extraction of only the net worth figure from
an audit report.'22
Although these courts evidenced some sensitivity to the complexity of the
audit function, they rarely treated the quality of the auditor's work as a
significant issue on appeal.' 23 The reason is not expressly indicated in most

11
See, e.g., Bily, 834 P.2d at 761, 763 (identifying the complexity of the audit as a factor in its
decision to limit negligence liability of auditors to third parties) H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138,
147 (N.J. 1983) (stating that "organizations depend upon intricate networks of accountability ... This
process of accounting is essential to the proper functioning of society and organizations"); Harper, 404
N.W.2d at 778 (noting that audit firm must do more than detect errors it must also provide critical analysis
and summary in lay terms); First Nat'l Bank of Bluefleld, 386 S.E.2d at 313-314 (an audit firm must rely
to some degree on the accuracy of client records); Blue Bell Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 416; Imark Indus. Inc., 436
N.W.2d at 319; (cited both auditing standards and audit firm's own audit manual to assert that an audit may
require firm to continue to examine open account records until the very end of the field work done in
conjunction with the audit).
"1
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988).
19
Id. at 612. See also Bily, 834 P.2d at 772 (identifying the need to emphasize that third parties
must show reliance on the audit report as an indispensable element of the claim).
12
RaritanRiver Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d 609, at 612.
121
Id. at 613.
Id. See also Eldred,468 N.W.2d at 219 (noting that investors who hadn't read the audit firm
122

report can not simply rely on the state who had read the report).
13
Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 3rd
DCA 1989); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 1983) (auditors are required to
report contingent liabilities of a client where they involve considerable degree of uncertainty and where an
adverse outcome would have material effect on financial statement); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 791-92
(Mont. 1990) (audit firm which asserts in engagement letter and audit report that its work was done in
conformity with GAAS and GAAP can not defend by asserting that the state accountancy board adopted
these standards after the audit in question); Lincoln Grain Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300,
304-06, and 308-09 (Neb. 1984) (audit firms must independently verify valuations provided by clients, and
failure to do so creates the foreseeable risk that future defalcations may occur); Seaward Int'l Inc., v. Price
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of courts' observations concerning the procedural history of these cases.124
Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Va. 1990) (plaintiff's expert's testimony evaluated to determine if it
provided proof that audit firm could have discovered sources to put client's claims in question); Imark
Indus. Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 319 (quality of audit work evaluated to aid the appellate court in resolving the
issue of allegedly inconsistent jury findings).
Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 324 (Miss. 1987) (court failed to
recognize that a key element of a quality audit is the early assessment of the adequacy of the internal
controls of the client) See also Bily, 834 P.2d at 748; Devco Premium Finance Co. v. North River Ins. Co.,
450 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d
300, 304 (Neb. 1984). See Epstein & Spaulding, supra note 2, at 21, 134 (demonstrating the significance
that self-regulation standards place on the assessment of the adequacy of the client's internal control system
for planning and conducting the audit).
Compare John Pickering, Liability Crisis Goes Global, ACCOUNTANCY TODAY, Nov. 1992, at 32
(identifying a $832 million dollar lawsuit filed against one of the "Big Six" firms by the subsequently
ousted Australian Labor Government in which a CEO had withheld information for years from his board
and the audit firm) with Walter P. Schuetze, Credibility in Question: A Little Backbone Would Cure Legal
Crisis, ACCOUNTANCY TODAY, Dec. 1992, at 10-11 (Chief Accountant for the SEC asserts that among the
underlying causes of the increase in litigation against accounting finns is the failure of these.firms in many
instances to ask clients the tough questions, and make unpopular decisions).
124
There are two categories of cases in which the appellate court's recitation of the procedural
history of the case did provide some basis for inferring why the quality of the audit was not a key appellate
issue, despite specific allegations of audit firm malpractice in the plaintiff's pleadings. First, there are those
cases in which the case was decided pre-trial or during trial and in turn appealed on a "threshold" procedural issue. Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 923 (Ala. 1987) (statute of limitations);
Hydroculture Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 848 P.2d 856, 859 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (summary judgment
granted accounting firm on client's negligence claim related to the firm's audit work); First Nat'l Bank of
Sullivan v. Brumleve and Dabbs, 539 N.E.2d 877 (111.App. Ct. 1989) (complaint dismissed pretrial);
Brumley v. Touche Ross, 487 N.E.2d 641, 642 (I11.App. Ct. 1985) (amended complaint dismissed pretrial);
Brueck v. Krings, 638 P.2d 904, 905 (Kan. 1982) (statute of limitations); Harper v. Inkster Pub. Schs., 404
N.W.2d 776, 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (summary dismissal of third party plaintiff's lawsuit on no duty
finding); Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (pretrial dismissal of
plaintiff's claims for failure to state a cause of action); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross &
Co., 452 N.W.2d 746,748-49 (Neb. 1990) (insurance company, surety for audit firm client, failed to properly plead that they had currently suffered damages).; Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 398 (N.J. 1984)
(motion to dismiss granted on grounds of limited immunity); Grant Thorton v. Windsor House, Inc., 566
N.E.2d 1220, 122 (Ohio 1991) (summary judgment granted audit firm on statute of limitations and no intended beneficiary grounds); Brown v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W. 2d 742, 743, 745 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) (summary judgment); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell, 715 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (pre-trial summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's complaint); and Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435
S.E.2d 628, 630 (Va. 1993) (trial judge granted defendant audit firm's pre-trial demurrer to breach of
contract and professional negligence claims, and dismissed third party beneficiary to contract claim at the
end of the plaintiff's trial evidence all on lack of duty/proof of intention to benefit grounds).
Second, cases in which there was evidence that the quality of the audit was contested at trial but eliminated as a key appellate issue: Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. 1987) (but focusing
opinion on scope of duty owed the third party); Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 179 (Iowa
1988) (focusing opinion on scope of duty owed the third party); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 316-318 (Miss. 1987); H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J.
1983) (but focusing opinion on scope of duty owed the third party); Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess
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All that can be fairly said concerning this issue is that either the lawyers for
the auditors and the plaintiffs chose not to make it a critical issue, or the trial
eliminated the quality of the audit as a critical appellate issue. 2
There is a third key lesson for auditors from the study of these decisions.
Some of these courts have interpreted the standard in a manner that discour26
ages auditors from asking the client to identify the purpose of the audit.

Marketing Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (focusing appellate opinion on scope of the
damages).
12
See supranote 124 and accompanying text. In the cases in this study, where there was at least
trial evidence with respect to the quality of the audit, that evidence provided a basis for the trier of fact to
almost always reasonably conclude that the audit was defective - i.e. not completed in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). See e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the
Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (jury found that audit firm negligently
prepared audit); Devco Premium Finance Co., 456 So. 2d at 1219; Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 179 (evidence
that financial statements prepared by audit firm overstated the financial "health" of the client); H.
Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 153 (reasonable inference that audit had been made carelessly and
negligently); University Nat'l Bank v. Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Greenstein, Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 185 (audit firm failed to comply with GAAS in conducting the
audits in question); Blue Bell, Inc., 715 S.W.2d at 413; Imark Indus., Inc., 436 N.W.2d at 319 (plaintiff
presented evidence that audit firm failed to apply proper auditing standards in recognizing as revenue the
amount of a disputed change order); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 363
(Wis. 1983) (plaintiff answers audit firm's motion for summary judgment by submitting affidavit of CPA
in which it was concluded that audit firm failed to adhere to GAAS).
12
Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989) (as long as the
audit firm doesn't ask purpose it won't learn that it is designed to influence any one or several creditors.
As long as creditors remain unspecified they can't be voluntarily contacted by an auditor and hence the
audit firm owes them no duty under the near privity standard); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell, & Co., 558
So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1990)(in discussion of the Restatement Second Standard, the court identified and
reprinted illustration "10" in the commentary - illustration clearly discourages auditor from asking client
about purpose of audit) Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 200 (Ga. 1987) (courts will seek to determine the
purpose of the audit in order to determine those third parties who the auditor knew its report was to
influence. An auditor who asks no questions about the purpose of the audit, may assume it is only for the
use of the client, and then repeat that understanding in the engagement letter).; Pahre, 422 N.W.2d at 180,
181 (auditors and their lawyers further discouraged from asking client about purpose of audit when state
supreme court further distorts the Restatement standard by limiting class of third parties to those that
auditor [rather than client- expected to influence); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d
110, 118 (N.Y. 1985) (near privity standard elements by definition discourage audit firm from asking client
purpose of audit); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 616 (N.C. 1988) (audit firm liability
should be limited to those third parties it knows will rely on their work).
See also Bily, 834 P.2d at
754,763, 773 (expressly acknowledging that pre-engagement knowledge by the audit firm that the purpose
of the audit is to influence specific third parties is a significant factor meriting possible liability,
undercutting for example the need to prove post-audit report contact by such an audit firm with such third
parties. Yet, later in the same opinion, the majority asserted that the audit firm may have been unaware of
the third party transaction that gave rise to the subsequent third party claim. Further the court stated that
if there is inadequate competent evidence that the audit firm knew of possible third parties that the audit
report is intended to influence, suriary judgment for the audit firm may be appropriate since the firm
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Some of these courts have concluded that the audit firm usually does not know
the purpose of the audit. 2
When a court discourages auditors from learning the purpose of an audit,
it also leaves judges free to speculate about the purpose of the audit." A few
of these courts have even speculated whether the engagement was intended to
be an audit.' 29 Hence, these courts have reinforced one of the most glaring

wasn't on notice of the scope of the risk that could result from undertaking the engagement.) See also
Seaward Int'l, Inc., v. Price Waterhouse, 391 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Va. 1990) (illustrating that even in
client/plaintiff cases, critical disputes can arise about the purpose of the audit, and the audit firm who fails
to asks and then negotiate with the client with respect to the purpose of the audit, is better served by the
legal standard crafted by the appellate court then one who does.)
127
Bily, 834 P.2d at 751 (acknowledging that the purpose of the audit is often to establish the
financial credibility of the client with third parties, who will then be more likely to lend or invest in the
entity, but also agreed with the presumption that the audit it primarily for internal use of the client); Raritan
River Steel, 367 S.E.2d at 616 (client may or may not intend to use the audit for other than internal
purposes - hence audit firm may have no idea that report may be distributed to others. Hence in fairness
audit firm should not be held liable when it is unaware of the use to which its report may be put)
In Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 367, the president of the audit firm acknowledged that he knew
audited statements are used for many purposes, and that it is common for them to be supplied to lenders,
creditors, and other persons). In Mid-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Harrison, 851 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) the accountant stated the purpose of his preparation of annual financial statements of the client
was only to influence two specific third parties). In Brown v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W. 2d 742, 74445 (Tx. App., 1993), an express provision of a limited partnership agreement required the annual
independent audit and a report to the partners. Yet the court in its analysis of the statute of limitations
issue, ignored the fact that this was the only purpose for the audit, and that therefore the limited partners
were in fact third party beneficiaries of the audit. See supra note 76.
Only a few cases in this study involved situations where the audit firm knew that the purpose of the
audit was to conform to statutory and/or regulatory requirements. See, e.g., Brueck, 638 P.2d at 906;
Lindner Fund, 770 S.W.2d at 438; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 140; Security Pac. Bus. Credit,Inc.,
597 N.E.2d at 1086; (publicly held firm primary reason for audit was to satisfy SEC regulations); and
Westpac Banking Corp., 484 N.E.2d at 1352.
123
Pahre, 422 N.W.2d at 180 and 181; H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 149; (listing various
common purposes for audits, including the influencing of a variety of third parties); CreditAlliance Corp.,
483 N.E.2d at 116 (quoting with apparent approval the view of Justice Cardozo expressed more than fifty
years earlier in the Ultramaresdecision, that the primary purpose of an audit is for the internal use of the
client).
129
Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Neb. 1984) (trial judge's
instructions characterized the audit as an "opinion audit" without defining "opinion" and without
apparently recognizing that all audits result in an "opinion" by the audit firm); Levine, 478 A.2d at 398
(appellate court characterized engagement as a binding valuation of a business asset under the appointment
of a court, and with the consent of the parties, to a divorce proceeding. Later in the opinion the court
describes the accountant's tasks so as to equate the engagement to an audit, Id. at 399.) First Nat'l Bank
of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313-314 (W. Va. 1989) (courts have recognized that there may
be several kinds of accounting audits - without express citation and without reference to accounting
standards identifying and sanctioning notion of several types of audits. Court also failed to infer from its
own restatement of the audit firm's understanding of the nature of the engagement that it had undertaken,
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omissions in current auditor self-regulation standards: the failure to compel
an audit firm to ask the client the purpose of the engagement prior to its
agreeing to undertake the work, and to restate those goals in the engagement
letter." The early, express identification of the purpose for the audit creates
the opportunity for the audit firm and the client to agree upon those third
parties to whom the audit will be presented.31

that in fact it was a review and not an audit, see Id. at 314 (n.10)). See also lntemt. Mortg. v. Butler
Accountancy, 221 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (Cal Ct. App., 1986) citing to specific professional audit standards
that suggest that when an audit firm has its name associated with reviewed financial statements, it should
expressly state the nature of the examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility the audit firm is
taking).
130
Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 923 (Ala. 1987) (illustrating an example of
an engagement letter making express reference to the purpose of the engagement, but implying that the
purpose is for internal client use only). See also Brueck, 638 P.2d at 906 (the engagement letter apparently
made no reference to the purpose of the audit).
See Annotation, Liability of Public Accountants to Third Parties,46 A.L.R.3d 979, 1001 (1972)
(suggesting that audit firms are aware of use of audited reports). See Miller supra note 12, at 3.07(
identifying those pre-engagement steps that an auditor should take to comply with current self-regulation
standards. The authors identify the topics to be covered with the client at a pre-engagement conference.
No mention is made of asking the client the purpose of the audit. The authors then follow with the standard
language to be included in an engagement letter. Again the standard letter omits any reference to the
auditor and client having identified the purpose of the audit; id. at 3.07-3.08). See Mark F. Murray,
DraftingAccountant EngagementLetters, PRAC. Law., Dec. 1992, at 61 (discussing drafting engagement
letters to reduce the risk of malpractice). Murray suggests that liability can be limited by identifying the
expected users of the report. He suggests that the audit firm could state in the engagement letter that it was
for client internal use only. Id. at 65. If the audit firm has failed to ask the client about the
purpose/proposed uses/users of the audit, such an assertion in the engagement letter should not aid in
limiting auditor liability.
131
Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d at 393 (reviewing Restatement Second cases and concluding
that the Restatement standard works so that the auditor and client can agree on the third parties to be
influenced by the audit); Bily, 834 P.2d at 767 (acknowledging that the engagement agreement between
client and audit firm could specifically identify a particular third party or parties so as to make them third
party beneficiaries to the contract); Badische Corp., 356 S.E.2d at 200; Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 323 (Miss. 1987); H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 152 (qualifying this
right to identify and thereby narrow the third parties to be influenced by the audit, to those situations where
the audit was of a privately owned company - because federal law and regulations that establish SEC
required audits of public companies would not permit such identification and narrowing) See also First
Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 709, 713 (S.D. 1986) (purpose of the audit
was to comply with express provision in the loan agreement that the debtor hire an audit firm. Hence this
creditor could have been identified in the engagement letter, and liability limited to that third person). See
also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tenn. 1991)(where the court
expressly stated that the critical point at which to examine the auditor's knowledge of the use of the audit
is at the time the audit report is published. This rule would thwart the negotiation point made herein, and
ignores the probability that audit planning should be influenced by advance knowledge of the third
party/type of third party the audit will be used to influence)
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Finally, these cases encourage auditors when drafting opinion letters to
consider cautioning even expected users that the passage of time is likely to
erode the reliability of the audit.'
B. Lessonsfor Lawyers
This article earlier identified two perspectives that members of the legal
profession may have when undertaking a review of the auditor liability cases
reviewed in this study.'33 First, most lawyers know that viable legal standards
seek to accommodate conflicting interest. This article has documented a close
split in the outcome of these decisions attributable in large part to the courts
selecting a standard of auditor liability that accommodates both the interests
of the accounting profession and that of the type of plaintiffs who filed these
13 4
lawsuits.
132

First Fla. Bank, 558 So. 2d at 9 (third party creditor demonstrates recognition of need to

examine interim reports); Eldred v. McGladrey, 468 N.W.2d 218, 220-221 (Iowa 1991) (audit firm is not
required to update materially correct audit report to reflect changes in the client's financial health it
discovers after the audit is completed, which don't materially change the accuracy of the financials for the
period covered by the audit); Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d at 324 (audit firm can't be held responsible
when loss of plaintiff was principally attributable to criminal fraud which began four months after the
completion of the audit); H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 140, 141; (owners of company to be bought out
and merged with audit firm's client, demonstrate recognition of need to be reassured that there were no
material changes since the financial representations made in the last audited statements). Raritan River
Steel Co., 367 S.E.2d at 613 (N.C. 1988) (an audit report represents the auditor's opinion of the accuracy
of the client's financial statements at a given period of time).
By the same token, however, cases in the study also recognize the reciprocal principle that an audit firm
which discovers evidence after completing the audit that makes the financials it has certified materially
inaccurate for the period covered in the statements, is obligated to correct those financials, and/or its
accompanying report. See, e.g., Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 1983);
H. Rosenblum inc., 461 A.2d at 140, 155.
The Auditing Practices Board has suggested that the "reliable life" of an audit is one year. Christine
Pearse, Liability: Case Law Accumulates, 110 AccoUNTANcY, Nov. 1992, at 114 (citing to a case that held
it unreasonable to rely on an audited financials when the audit was already fifteen months old).
More indirect measures of how to determine if audited financials are still reliable come from selfregulation and other authorities. A user of such evidence should examine the quality of the internal control
system of the client, consistency of use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, viability of the client
entity as an on-going concern, and the identification of changes in the use of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles that could materially affect the future financial health of the client entity. See Epstein
and Spaulding, supra note 2, at 134-137 (identifying two recent enactments (Federal Corrupt Practices Act
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act) and self-regulation actions (Treadway
Commission Reports), which emphasize the significance of the auditor assessment of the internal control
system of the entity and requiring reporting on the effectiveness of the internal controls by the entity).
1
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
14
See supra notes 102-105 and text accompanying those notes and immediately proceeding note
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For example, all current standards of legal liability, including the "nearprivity" standard, would hold an auditor had a duty to an institutional creditor
of the client who paid in whole or in part for that audit. 3 ' Lawyers for such
institutional creditors who study these cases and learn this lesson could
recommend that their clients change their lending practices to attempt to
insure that they "buy-in" to the audit or an audit update.' 36 Most of these
standards, on the other hand, would also sanction house counsel for an
auditing firm revising opinion letters to carefully spell out the circumstances
and duration for which reliance would be warranted by the client and other
users of the audit report.' 37

102, and notes 107-110 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 817-18 (1984) (identifying interest at risk with respect to completion and use of an audit report).
133
See supra notes 86,88-89 and accompanying text.
136
Bily, 834 P.2d at 765,769 (third parties, whose audit firm is not aware they will rely on audit,
can directly contact audit firm and obtain report for own use and benefit); First Fla. Bank v. Max Mitchell
& Co., 558 So. 2d 9,10 (Fla. 1990) (creditor recognized need to examine subsequent interim reports. Once
such recognition is demonstrated, a creditor need only offer to pay to expedite the preparation of the interim
reports); Huls v. Clifton, Gunderson & Co., 535 N.E.2d 72, 74 (111.App. Ct. 1989) (third party plaintiff
demonstrated recognition of option of hiring another audit firm to review financials); Pahre v. Auditor of
State, 422 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 1988)(recognizing that third party may pay for work done by
professional); Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (n. 12) (NJ., 1983)(citing to decision by an Ontario,
Canada court which recognized that a third party could recover the costs of paying for a new audit from an
audit firm who prepared a negligent audit); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118
(N.Y. 1985) (citing two earlier decisions, one in which the third party paid for the audit, and another in
which the auditor was paid extra by the client for furnishing the report directly to the third party plaintiff);
FirstNat'l Bank ofMinneapolis, 394 N.W.2d at 713 (express provision in the loan agreement between the
third party creditor and the audit firm's eventual client required the client to have the audit in question
done). See supranotes 76. See also Colonial Bank ofAla., 551 So. 2d at 395 (illustrating how such a buyin would alter the outcome of a lawsuit filed on behalf of a "listed creditor").
137
First Fla.Bank, 558 So. 2d at 14 (Fla. 1990); Lincoln Grain, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 345
N.W.2d 300, 307 (Neb. 1984) (sanctioning specific instruction based on apparent disclaimer in the
engagement letter that ordinary audit is not a fraud detection audit); H. Rosenblum Inc., 461 A.2d at 152
(a court which adopted the reasonably foreseeable standard of third party liability reasoned that at least
commentators had recommended that such liability could be limited by express disclaimers); First Nat'l
Bank of Bluefield v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 314-315 (W. Va. 1989) (audit firm may make specific
disclaimers, the reasonableness of which will be judged by the nature of the engagement it has undertaken.
It cannot, however, simply proclaim that its work, given its nature, is unworthy of reliance and it must
disclose discovered material flaws in the reports of its clients). See also supra note 132 - with regard to
reliable life of an audit. See also Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 923 (Ala.
1987)(providing an example of an auditor's attempt to draft an express disclaimer that did not survive
proper evaluation by courts).
Sometimes lawyers and courts have characterized as "disclaimers," statements by audit firms that were
in fact admissions that the field work/verification steps contemplated in the audit plan were not executed
as planned because the client or the audit firm or both decided that all verification steps need not be
completed. See Murray supra note 130, at 65-66 (advocating consideration of inclusion in engagement
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Second, this article suggested that most lawyers would want development
of the auditor malpractice standard to be consistent with the evolution of the
malpractice standard for lawyers and other professionals. 3 When asked to
select a standard for the scope of the duty auditors owe to third parties, a
majority of these courts did express a preference for employing the same
standard as was employed in lawyer and other professional malpractice
cases.' 39 Only in a few statute of limitations decisions, where auditors were
treated worse or better than lawyers, and in states which chose the privity/near
privity standard of auditor liability to third persons, where the standard
possibly provided auditors more protection than lawyers, was this preference
for the same standards not clearly followed." 4
letters of an express disclaimer or client hold harmless clause). Murray doesn't dispute that a disclaimer
clause would not excuse an audit firm's failure to comply with current self-regulation standards, especially
in light of the fact that the audit report routinely claims that the audit was done in compliance with GAAS.
See also Epstein and Spaulding supra note 2, at 134 (identifying recent self-regulation standards which
include disclaimers apparently aimed at users). The difficulty here of course is that such users are not
charged with responsibility of knowing these self-regulation standards, and that an audit firm which failed
to follow self-regulation standards generally would not necessarily be allowed to shield its liability based
on broad "no guarantee" language.
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See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Blumberg, 514 So. 2d at 926 (implied, by nature of precedent relied upon); Bily, 834 P.2d at
770; Coopers & Lybrand v. Trustees of the Archdiocese of Miami, 536 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA
1989); Pahre,422 N.W.2d at 181 (same scope of duty standard for appraisers); Brumley v. Touche Ross,
487 N.E.2d 641,644 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (audit finn duty to third party patterned after lawyer third party
liability standard); Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Minn. 1983) (adhering to its rule
that professionals can't be held strictly liable); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 400 (N.J. 1984);
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tenn. 1991); University Nat'l Bank v.
Ernst & Whinney, 773 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Blue Bell Inc. v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell,
715 S.W.2d 408, 412-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 632-33 (Va. 1993)
(adherence to privity standard for all professional malpractice actions); FirstNat'l Bank of Bluefield, 386
S.E.2d at 313 (selecting the Restatement second rule with respect to an audit firm's liability to third
parties,in part, because it is the same standard applied to other professionals); Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis. 1983) (applying the reasonably foreseeable scope of duty
standard to auditors, in part because it had been recently decided by the same court that it was the
appropriate standard for attorneys) See Eric R. Dinallo, The Peculiar Treatment of Contributory
Negligence in Accountant'sLiability Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L REV. 329, 351 (1990) (commentary advocating
similar treatment of auditors with regard to the use of the contributory negligence doctrine in malpractice
cases). See also Mednick, supra note 14 at 31, demonstrating that even in its drive to seek relief from
increased exposure to legal liability, the accounting profession has acknowledged the need for fairness and
not privilege for the profession,.
14
Local 1064 v. Ernst & Young, 516 N.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Mich. Ct App. 1994) (auditors treated
not as well as attorneys with respect to the number of years plaintiffs have to file claims. Court rejected
application of two year malpractice statute of limitations to auditors on grounds that common law "malpractice" didn't include auditors. Court identifies either three or six year statute of limitations as correct
statute for auditors); Investors Reit One v. Jacobs, 546 N.E.2d 206,211 (Ohio 1989) (auditors treated less
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Part 3 - Summary of Key Findings and Future Research Issues
A. Key Findings
This article has "restated" the common law liability decisions of twentytwo state supreme courts and intermediate appellate opinions from five
additional states during the period 1980-94. These decisions were then
categorized as either favorable to auditors or favorable to the plaintiffs, and
then evaluated for their significance to the accounting and legal professions.
Several findings have surfaced in this study.
First, there has been a fair amount of common law activity concerning
auditor liability. More cases have been decided by these courts in this fifteen
year period than in the prior eighty years of the twentieth century. 14 1 Second,
in deciding cases, these courts split almost equally in favor of audit firms and
plaintiffs.142 Most significantly the state supreme courts split evenly, ten
making their decision(s) or a majority of their decisions in favor of audit
firms, ten in favor of plaintiffs, and two deciding an equal number of cases in
favor of audit firms and plaintiffs. 43 Third, despite the substantial increase
in the number of such decisions, the outcomes of these cases signal to both
professions that these courts' identification, evaluation, and accommodation
of the interests at stake in auditor liability disputes is still in flux.1" Fourth,
accounting and legal professions' perspectives were evaluated to account for
the close outcome split, and it was concluded that the most significant reason
comes from among the perspectives of the legal profession. 45 This perspective was identified as the receptivity of these state supreme and other inter-

and more favorably than doctors and lawyers in malpractice lawsuits with respect to a statute of limitations
defense. Ohio Supreme Court decided general four year rather than one year malpractice statute of
limitations is the appropriate statute of limitations for accounting malpractice, but then refused to apply
"date of discovery" accrual rule to accountants, after having already ruled that "discovery" rule applies to
doctors and lawyers); Grant Thorton v. Windsor House, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ohio 1991); Brown
v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 856 S.W. 2d 742,747 (Tex.Ct. App. 1993) (audit firm treated better than attorneys
potentially with respect to the accrual date of a malpractice action). See Travis Dodd, Accounting
Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justifying Disparate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's
Unique Role, 80 GEO. L. 909, 930 (1992) ( commentary advocating dissimilar treatment of auditors with
regard to the use of the contributory and comparative negligence doctrines in malpractice cases).
141
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
142
See supra notes 48 and accompanying text.
143
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
I"
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
145
See supra notes 59-110 and accompanying text.
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mediate appellate courts to various "theories of the case", particularly negligence claims for third parties and contract claims for clients as plaintiffs.'"
The fifth key finding of this article was that the dominant concerns that
the accounting profession has with the increased litigation against it were
being addressed to some significant degree in the decisions of these most
powerful state courts." The outcomes and reasoning of the cases in this
study suggest that the accounting profession should have little concern that
courts view it as the "deep pocket" when tht; however, the high rate of claims
brought against accountants provides a basis for inferring that lawyers for
plaintiffs so view audit firms.' 48
In order for the second identified concern of auditors to be better
addressed, the attorneys for audit firms and plaintiffs should focus more on the
audit firms' compliance with Generally Accepted Auditing and Accounting
Standards and Principles in fashioning their "theories of the case and
appeal."' 49 For example, in preventing litigation and in fashioning their
"theories of the case and appeal" in third party plaintiff cases, attorneys
should note that these critical state appellate courts show a preference for
private ordering to resolve claims against audit firms, and give significance to
private ordering that in fact appears in the record in making their decisions. 5
The problem, however, is that these cases reveal little evidence of a systematic
resort to such private ordering by audit firms or plaintiffs. Significantly,
current accounting self-regulation standards do not require private ordering.
In most of these cases, the audit firms did not specifically ask the client about
the purpose of the audit, or about whom the audit was specifically intended to
influence.' There is little evidence in these cases, on the other hand, that
users of the audit ever examined its age or inquired as to its useful life, nor do
express a willingness to "buythird party complaints seem to systematically
52
in" to an audit or pay for an update.
When neither side used private ordering, these cases suggest that lawyers
for both audit firms and plaintiffs should focus more on the related issues of
whether the plaintiff relied in fact on the audit report, and whether that
reliance was reasonable.' 53 This greater focus on the issues of plaintiff
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150
151
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See supra notes 69-110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

111-125 and accompanying text.
113-115 and accompanying text.
123-125 and accompanying text.
130-132, and 135-137 and accompanying text.
130-131 and accompanying text.
132, 135-137 and accompanying text.
76-77, 118-122, 131 and accompanying text. The lawyers would turn to the

content of the audit report, including any qualifications or reservations contained therein. The focus would
be on if, how, and when the audit report was used by this plaintiff, and on the normative role played by the
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reliance and the reasonableness of that reliance, rather than on the more
"political" scope of duty issue, is far more likely to lead to a search in the
record for facts that provide a reasonable accommodation of the interests of
the accounting profession and plaintiffs, particularly third party plaintiffs.154
The sixth key finding of this article is the identification of the dominant
concerns of the legal profession regarding the increased litigation against audit
firms in state courts.155 First, the interests of the audit firms, and by extension
law firms, have been reasonably accommodated in these decisions. 5 6 Second,
lawyers and accountants, for the most part, were treated equally in these
decisions with respect to malpractice standards and related procedural
issues." 7
B. Future ResearchIssues
The findings of this article suggest the following will remain important
future research issues for both professions. First, will the number of
decisions, of state supreme courts, on the common law standard of auditor
liability continue at the same accelerated rate as during the 1980-94 period
studied in this article? As lawsuits against audit firms continue to be filed,
future research might track whether the law of auditor liability remains "in
flux" during the last half of the decade of the 1990's and into the first years
of the next century.'
Will (for example) the close split in the outcomes of
these state appellate court decisions continue during this period? Will most
state supreme courts continue to choose the "middle standard" i.e. of the
Restatement Second with respect to the scope of the duty auditors owe third
parties? Will the trend towards a uniform malpractice standard for all
professionals continue?
Third, research by scholars from both professions should continue to
explore if non-big six firms continue to fare roughly as well as big six firms
with respect to state appellate court outcomes?159 What will be the impact on

audit report in decisions of the type made by this type of plaintiff. See Dodd, supra note 140, at 920-21
(suggesting that the reliance issue should play a more significant role when clients sue their audit finn).
154
See supra notes 86, 89, 93, 98, 100-101 (discussing the reasons various courts chose one of the
several duty standard options). See also supra notes 76-77, 86, 110 (documenting that lawyers for audit
firms during this period sometimes argued that the audit firm owed only a duty to the public and concerned

third parties when a client sued, and other times argued that the audit firm should have no duty to anyone
other than the client when a third party filed the lawsuit).
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notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
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auditor liability if all concerned parties resort more heavily to private
ordering, such as by carefully identifying the purpose of the audit and who
therefore is intended to be influenced by the audit and for what period of
time? Will an evaluation of the quality of the auditor's work come to play a
more significant role in auditor liability litigation during this period?
Finally, future doctrine and empirical research should focus on fostering
greater dialogue between the accounting and legal professions." Surveys of
the members of both professions about key malpractice issues are rare. Little
or no data exists on how often lawyers draft or review audit firm engagement
letters for the purpose of reducing the risk of subsequent legal liability.
Similarly, detailed data with respect to the costs of malpractice insurance
attributable to the filing of lawsuits, the settlement of lawsuits, trial of
lawsuits, and appeal of lawsuits are not readily available. 6 ' Research is
needed to assure that the interests of both professions are reasonably
accommodated in the future.
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Representatives from the professional committees from national organizations such as the ABA

Standing Committee on Lawyer Professional liability report that the AICPA and the ABA have not taken
concerted actions to study the malpractice crisis and the common ground that the professions share with
respect to such litigation. In recent years, attorneys and auditors have certainly shared the experience of
being jointly sued co-defendants, especially in litigation arising from the savings and loan industry collapse.
See Diane Cox, ProfessionalsDefend Themselves, NAT. U., Mar. 1992. On the other hand, there is some
perception in the accounting profession that segments of the legal profession are fueling the increased risk
that auditors will be sued to further their own self interests. See Reeves, supra note 1. See also Murray
supra note 130 (noting that attorneys should write or review accountant engagement letters to reduce the
risk of subsequent litigation/successful litigation). See also Murray, The Engagement Letter: A Good
Defense Measure, THE PRACTICING CPA, July 92 (same author writing on same topic directed to
accounting firms).
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For evidence that the ABA and AICPA have cooperated in the past to resolve audit issues of
importance to both professions, see SAS #12. In a winter of 1993 telephone conversation between the
director of the ABA Lawyer Professional Liability Committee and the authors of this article, the director
noted the lack of data to support the contention that at least with respect to lawyers there was a malpractice
crisis (i.e. a significant increase in the number of lawsuits filed against lawyers over the course of the
1980's and into the 1990's, or a resulting significant impact on the availability and cost of malpractice
insurance for lawyers). She also noted the difficulty even the ABA Standing Committee had in collecting
systematic data on malpractice claims and insurance coverage and rates. She felt that two of the key
reasons for this difficulty were reluctance of a sufficient number of insurance companies to provide comprehensive claims data, and the significant number of lawyers without malpractice insurance. See supra
note 9 (identifying sources that demonstrate that the accounting profession has done better in collecting
such data from its members, and that about forty percent of smae same perception by the legal profession
concerning legal malpractice, see also Couric, supra note 1, at 68.

